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Human culture taken as a whole
may be described as the process of man's
progressive self-liberation.I
INTRODUCTION

We live in a century of proliferating paradigms of thought. In
physics, philosophy, theology, history, sociology, and psychology,
traditional paradigms compete with emerging paradigms. In many
instances, these new paradigms present fundamentally different
ways of thinking from which arise radically new formulation, analysis, and action. These differences reflect antithetical world views
with opposing conceptions of the most basic issues.'
Criminal law jurisprudence represents a traditional paradigm
of thought which dominates most thinking about criminal law and
which determines most of our practice. Even criticism and reform
proposals are usually expressions of this traditional thinking. This
article presents a critique of criminal law jurisprudence which focuses on the principal justifications of punishment. The critique examines some of the underlying metaphysical, epistemological, and
ethical presuppositions of criminal jurisprudence. The article also
outlines an alternative justification of punishment: a different way
of thinking which leads to different formulation, analysis, and action. Both the critique and the alternative manifest a humanistic
perspective.
The principal justifications of punishment are general deterrence and retribution. 3 These justifications, along with a dominant
1.

E. CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN 228 (1944).
2. Compare B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971) with S.
FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1935) and C. ROGERS, ON
BECOMING A PERSON (1961).
3. This article does not deal with two prevalent justifications of punishment:
rehabilitation and incapacitation. For books containing worthwhile critiques of rehabilitation, see AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

(1971); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). Incapacitation does not appear to be a separate
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conception of the role of the criminal law in society, comprise central elements in traditional criminal law jurisprudence. This jurisprudence, and its underlying network of presuppositions, are vivid
examples of what Edmond Cahn aptly characterized as "the impe4
rial or official perspective" for viewing the problems of society.
Cahn believed that this perspective "controls the thinking of most
lawyers, judges, politicians, and businessmen." '5 He terms this
view an imperial or official perspective because it is largely the
product of "rulers, governors and other officials" in every part of
the world. 6 It is a perspective for those committed to the status
quo. In an American context, it is for the affluent and successful,
for Presidents, for the Chamber of Commerce, for the National
Association of Manufacturers, for the leadership of the AFL-CIO,
for the professional and technical elites, for the authors of high
school civics and history textbooks-for all of the purveyors of the
officially sanctioned dream. In a Soviet context, it is for the members of the Communist Party, for the military, for the secret police,
for the censors, for the managers, for the official poets, painters,
and writers, for the new Communist bourgeoisie. In short, this
perspective is for all those who are, or who hope to be, primary
beneficiaries of social, political, and economic arrangements dominated by elite groups.
General deterrence theory is an excellent example of the imperial perspective. General deterrence, or what Johannes Andenaes
calls general prevention, has been defined as the "restraining influ7
ences emanating from the criminal law and the legal machinery."
justification; it is descriptive of one technique of punishment-imprisonment. It is
not by itself a justification for that form of punishment. As a technique, incapacitation
is included in general deterrence, in individual deterrence (which is also not discussed in this article), and is often emphasized in rehabilitation.
4. Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1963).
Cahn elaborates in E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN (1961), on an
"imperial or official perspective." It is the "fixed and habitual attitudes of virtually
all past eras":
The old political, social, and legal perspective, developed and reinforced

over millennia of time and continents of space, was determined by the dominant interests of rulers, governors, and other officers . . . . The classic
philosophers of government, at least after the death of Aristotle, developed
their theories while observing the ways of empires, kingdoms, landed aristocracies, or oligarchies. Consequently, to achieve a consumer perspective a
shift of as much as 180 degrees is called for.
Id. at 28.
5. E. CAHN, supra note 4, at 30.
6. See id. at 28.
7. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
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It includes the threat of penal law enforcement-what Andenaes
calls "mere deterrence" 8-as well as what he calls the general preventive effects of the penal law-its ripple effect in "moral or
socio-pedagogical influence." 9 " '[M]essages' sent by law and the
legal processes [to the public] contain factual information about
what would be risked by disobedience [as well as] proclamations
specifying that it is wrong to disobey."' 0
Belief in the theory and practice of general deterrence is experiencing a renaissance. Legal commentators, and others, are engaged in many new analyses and studies. Norval Morris describes
deterrence as the "primary and essential postulate"" of "every
criminal law system in the world."' s H.L.A. Hart describes it as
the primary task of the criminal law. 13 Johannes Andenaes says it
"has occupied and still occupies a central position in the philosophy
of criminal law, in penal legislation, and in the sentencing policies
of the courts." 14 These modern commentators agree with many of
the older authorities. In the words of C.S. Kenny:
According to the most generally accepted writers, as for instance Beccaria, Blackstone, Romilly, Paley, Fueuerbach, this
hope for preventing the repetition of the offense is not only a
main object, but the sole permissible object, of inflicting a criminal punishment .... [The prevention of crime is a] paramount
and universally admitted object of punishment ....15
General deterrence is important not only as a favorite paradigm of
penal theoreticians; it is immensely influential and popular among
Presidents, governors, legislators, and administrators, who often
urge it as the justification for far-reaching programs in criminal law
10
and criminal justice and even as the answer to the crisis of crime.
REv. 949, 949 (1966). General deterrence should be distinguished from special deterrence, which refers to the "threat of further punishment of one who has already

been convicted and punished for crime." N. Moiuus & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST
POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 255 (1970).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Andenaes, supra note 7, at 950.
Id. (emphasis deleted).
Id. (emphasis deleted).
N. MORRIS & G. HAWIUNS, supra note 7, at 254.
Id.

H.L.A. HART,PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 27 (1968).
14. Andenaes, supra note 7, at 953.
15. C.S. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAw 27-28 (1907).
16. The daily newspapers abound in illustrations. For example, former President Nixon stated in a position paper on crime that "'[i]f the conviction rate were
doubled in this country, it would do more to eliminate crime in the future than a
quadrupling of the funds for any governmental war on poverty.'" R. HARIMS, THE
13.
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The first thesis of this article is that general deterrence is a
repugnant justification for the criminal law process in any segment
of the twentieth century world committed to humanistic views of
the person and society. Its presuppositions, its formulations of the
problem of crime, its mode of analysis, and its conclusions, should
be considered bankrupt. General deterrence is repugnant because
it formulates the issue of crime solely as an individual phenomenon
and rests on a characterization of the offender as an "indispensable
sacrifice to the common safety," an "example," and even a "scapegoat." Its conception of crime and crime control is reductionist; its
conception of responsibility is inherently scapegoatist; and its conception of sentencing is inevitably highly politicized and lawless. It
does not violate justice-it displaces justice with a "calculus of social interest" weighted against the individual. Indeed, it is not really a justification of punishment, but a rationalization and weapon
of the status quo and its ideological and material structures.
The second thesis of this article focuses on retribution, which,
unlike general deterrence, does not lend itself to a definition commanding general support. An array of retributive conceptions
exists, and are often blended with utilitarian ideas. This article presents and criticizes the retributive theories of Kant, Hegel, and
Herbert Morris. In addition, certain popular approaches to retribution are analyzed. As with general deterrence, retribution is impor73-74 (1969) (quoting President Nixon's position paper entitled Toward Freedom from Fear). Deterrence-based reasoning also frequently dominates
the formal justifications offered by governors and legislators for severe penalties. For
example, a coalition of Democratic and Republican legislators in New York State
defeated a bill in May 1975 which would have made certain long term inmates eligible for parole as much as five years earlier than at present by arguing that the change
"would erode the deterrent effect of sentences and would spark anger in a public
already fearful of the criminal problem." N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 70, col. 1.
Such comments by modern legal theorists and others echo traditional interpretations
of the function and purpose of general deterrence. To illustrate, Herbert Wechsler
emphasizes that "[a]s an historical matter there is fairly strong evidence that those
who provided the basic ideas . . . held that the dominant ends of the law should be
the deterrence of potential offenders." Wechsler, Book Review, 37 COLuM. L. REv.
687, 690 (1937). Justice Holmes defines general deterrence as the "chief and only
universal purpose of punishment." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAwV 40 (M. Howe
ed. 1963). Influential English theorists in the past stressed that "[pirevention is the
great end of all legal severity nay, the exerting that severity, by making examples of
the guilty, has no other intention but to deter others." M. MADAN, THOUGHTS ON
FEAR OF CIuME

EXECUTIVE JUSTICE 12 (London 1785), quoted in L. RADziNo-WiCz, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 240-41 (1948). Others have indicated that the object of all

punishment is not the satisfaction ofjustice but the prevention of crime. See, e.g., W.
PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 407 (London 1785),
quoted in L. RADzINokvcz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 250 (1948).
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tant not only as a favorite paradigm of certain philosophical and
legal theorists; it is also immensely influential and popular among
judges, legislators, and the public. A triumph of the revival of retribution is the constitutional approval of the death penalty by the
United States Supreme Court, principally on retributive grounds.
In the words of Justice Stewart, concurring in Furman v. Georgia:17 "[T]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man,
and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law."' 8 Moreover, in Gregg v. Georgia,19 the Court
stated: "'Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law' . . . but neither is it a forbidden objective nor one
20
inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men."
The second thesis of this article is that retribution is as repugnant a justification for the criminal law process as is general deterrence. The Kantian and Hegelian theories of retribution presuppose central theories in the political and social dimension of their
philosophies. Accept these presuppositions and the retributive
theories follow. Reject these presuppositions and the theories fall;
indeed, they then make little sense. They are dependent theories,
really subtheories: They have the character of epiphenomenon.
Narrowly, the theories, though different, should be rejected because the conception of punishment in both is one-sided, reductionist, and scapegoatist. Broadly, the Hegelian theory should be
rejected as part of Hegel's philosophical glorification of the state. In
W. Friedmann's words:
Hegel's teaching of the function of the individual in [the] state,
and in particular his thesis that true freedom is gained only
through the individual's integration in [the] state [is related to
his] identification of the state with freedom and the "reality of
the moral idea." [Thus,] Hegel finds it easy to subordinate the
individual to any claim of the conservative nationalist monarchy
21
which he revered.
Herbert Morris, a contemporary exponent of Kantian retributivism,
offers a theory of retribution which should be rejected as an eloquent
17.
18.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).

19. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
20. Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
21. W. FRIEDmANN, LEGAL THEORY 174 (5th ed. 1967) (citing C. FRiEDRICH,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1958)).
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and sophisticated expression of imperial reasoning. Neither Kant,
Hegel, nor Morris should be faulted for the diverse popular forms
of retribution. Neither should these popular forms be justified by the
theories of these philosophers. The popular forms of retribution
are really a rationalization and weapon of the status quo, not a justification for punishment.
The third, closely related, thesis of this analysis is that the traditional, fundamental role of the criminal law-to support the
dominant moral and social status quo-is also objectionable from a
humanistic perspective. Criminal law support for current arrangements should be explicitly contingent upon a status quo which is
just. The inadequacy of the traditional articulation of this role is
succinctly exemplified by Roscoe Pound's statement that the
"criminal law exists to maintain social interests as such,"-2 2 and
in
Justice Holmes's similar assertion that "'Tfor the most part, the
purpose of the criminal law is only to induce external conformity
to rule." 23 This inadequacy is also manifested in a Soviet context
by an official characterization that "[c]riminal law is designed to
provide protection for the Soviet social and state system, socialist property, and the person and rights of citizens against criminal
encroachments." 24 This inadequate conception of the role of the
criminal law makes it easier for the criminal law to become the
tool of any group that possesses power, whether it be theocratic
or capitalistic, fascist or Marxist. The criminal law system and
the "social interests" protected should be judged, not assumed to
25
be, valid.
The culminating thesis of this article is that the role of the
criminal law should be reformulated from a weapon of the status
quo to an instrument for fostering human rights. This new human
rights role for the criminal law must be justified. At the same time,
there is an accompanying need for a critical, humanistic consciousness to replace the traditional, status quo consciousness which
underlies general deterrence, retribution, and the dominant conception of the criminal law role.
22.

Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City, in REPORTS OF THE

CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 559, 576 (1922).
23. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 42.
24. SOVIET POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAV
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 258 (V.

Chkikvadze ed. & Y. Sdobnikov trans. 1969).
25. See id. at 19.
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If the theory and practice of deterrence and retribution, and of
the traditional role of the criminal law, are examples of an imperial
perspective on the problems of society, the analysis offered in this
article emerges from an antithetical, humanistic perspective. With
significant historical antecedents, a humanistic perspective has
emerged in the twentieth century as an influential current in philosophy, theology, psychology, and sociology. 26 Although by no
means monolithic in character, this humanistic view is founded on
a commonly shared myth: that the person and humankind are the
source of value, the focal point in determining purpose, policy, and
practice. As Cahn notes:
Only when we put the old [imperial] view aside . . . are we
able to perceive the practical significance of our institutions,
laws, and public transactions in terms of their impacts on the
lives and homely experiences of human beings. It is these personal impacts that constitute the criteria for any appraisal we
may make. How, we ask, does the particular institution affect
personal rights and personal concerns, the interests and aspirations of individual, group, and community? We judge it accord27
ing to its concussions on human lives.
Humanism gives rise to a vision of humankind and social life in
which the quest for human liberation for oneself and for others is a
26. Philosophers, religious thinkers, sociologists, and psychologists who have
influenced the humanistic perspective presented in this article include the following: W. BARRET, IRRATIONAL MAN (1958); W. BARRET, WHAT is EXISTENTIALISM?
(1964); E. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EvIL (1975); E. BECKER, THE STRUCTURE OF
EVIL (1968); P. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE
(1963); J. BONDURANT, CONQUEST FOR VIOLENCE: THE OHANDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF

CONFLICT (1958); M. BUBER, I AND THOU (1970); E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION

(1955); E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN (1961); E. CASSIRER, 2
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS: MYTHICAL THOUGHT (R. Manheim trans.
1957); J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1973); E. FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING
(1956); A. HESCHEL, WHO IS MAN? (1965); I. HOROWITZ, THE NEW SOCIOLOGY
(1964); HUMANIST MANIFESTOS I AND 11 (1973); K. JASPERS, EXISTENTIALISM AND
HUMANISM (1952); K. JASPERS, THE FuTURE OF MANKIND (1961); R.D. LAING, THE
POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967); H. MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL
(2d ed. 1954); A. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SCIENCE (1966); A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1968); C.W.
MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1969); PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEILHARD
CONFERENCE (Human Energetics Research Institute 1964); W. RYAN, BLAMING THE
VICTIM (1971); T. SZASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); P. TEILHARD DE
CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (1959); P. TILLICH, THE COURAGE To BE
AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

(1952); P. TILLICH, LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE (1954). The humanistic movement in
Marxism also is noteworthy. See, e.g., E. FROMM, SOCIALIST HUMANISM (1965); M.
HARRINGTON, SOCIALISM (1972).

27.

E. CAHN, supra note 4, at 30.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/1

8

Delaney: Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law: A Humanistic Persp
1978]

HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL LAW

primary task of life. Humanists reject the ground of reality that is
rooted in status quo social arrangements. They substitute another
ground of reality-human liberation and service to humankind in
this quest. The shift in ground of reality is basic: It gives rise to
radically different modes of perception, imagery, and thought-a
different consciousness which is expressed in a radically different
28
network of master beliefs.
28. Master beliefs expressing different forms of consciousness play a central role
in societal legitimation. Max Weber writes that each type of "domination" in a society
(i.e. (1) charismatic; (2) traditional; and (3) legal) manifests a need to justify itself:
He who is more favored feels the never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way "legitimate," upon his advantage as "deserved," and the
other's disadvantage as being brought about by the latter's "fault." ...
• . . Every highly privileged group develops the myth of its natural,
especially its blood, superiority....
Indeed, the continued exercise of every domination.. . always has the
strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of its
legitimation.
M. WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 335-36 (1954). Other social theorists
describe this process in different language. C. Wright Mills suggests that "[e]very
society holds images of its own nature-in particular, images and slogans that justify
its system of power and the ways of the powerful." C.W. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL
IMAGINATION 80 (1959). Mills also suggests that "[those in authority attempt to justify their rule over institutions by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence,
with widely-believed-in moral symbols, sacred emblems, legal formulae." Id. at 36.
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman stress that all institutional orders require
"legitimation," a process of explaining and justifying. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 93 (1967). These explanations and justifica-

tions include proverbs, moral maxims, legends, and folk tales as well as "explicit
theories," id. at 94, and "symbolic universes," id. at 95, which are "bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality." Id. "[Tihe symbolic universe provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the
hierarchy of human experience." Id. at 98. It provides "sheltering canopies over the
institutional order as well as over individual biography." Id. at 102. McDougal and
Lasswell refer to the
dominant beliefs, assumptions and loyalties (the myth) of any given society ....

Each value-institution pattern has a specialized system of myth and of
operational technique. The myth falls into three parts: doctrine, formula,
folklore. Political doctrines, for instance, include the prevailing philosophies
of politics and law. Economic doctrines include theoretical justifications of
capitalism or socialism. Respect doctrines either justify social class discrimination or the opposite. And every other value has its doctrinal myth.
McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,53 Am. J. INT'L. L. 1, 13 (1959).
It should be noted that recognition of the function and significance of the symbolic universe or mythological structure is not inconsistent with sharp conflict among
different social interests in the society. For example, in Soviet Russia, there may
often be such conflict among representatives of the party and the military and industrial managers over the relative priorities of party, military, and industrial projects in
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A contrast of key master beliefs illustrates the differences in
the two competing structures of thought presented in archetypical
2 9

form:

Key Master Beliefs in
Imperial Consciousness

Key Master Beliefs in
Humanistic Consciousness

1. Society (culture and institutions)
tends to be viewed as a product of
God
- History
- Nature
- Cosmic Laws
- Biology

Society (culture and institutions) is
viewed as a humanly-created social reality, a result of political, social, and
ethical choices.

2. Society is viewed as valid because it is grounded in God, History, and Nature.

Society is viewed as valid insofar as it
serves its members and humankind in
attaining realization.

3. Society is viewed as objective.

Society is viewed as embodying and
fostering clusters of values, ideologies,
and social interests.

4. The future is viewed as an organic
development from the past and
present, a largely predetermined
unfolding.

The future is viewed as a social reality
which is shaped by human choice.

5. Societal mystification and obfuscation of phenomena are necessary
instruments of social control.

Mystification and obfuscation are not
seen as necessary for social control.

6. Society can validly use the individual as a means for societal benefit (e.g., social control).

Societal benefits (including social control) should not be achieved by instrumental use of individuals.

7. The political and social responsibility of individuals should be to con-

The political and social responsibility of
individuals should be to conform to

apportioning the national budget; in the United States, there is often conflict between the leadership of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the
leadership of the AFL-CIO over economic issues. But all this conflict is at a particular level and generally presupposes the validity of the underlying social interests and
the related symbolic universe or mythological structure. The Soviet groups, for
example, are committed to a general Marxist position and the NAM and the AFLCIO are committed to a neo-capitalist position. The contrast is with dissenters who
reject the reigning social interests and symbolic universe and suggest a fundamental
change (e.g., Solzhenitsyn in Soviet Russia and Michael Harrington in the United
States). In this analysis, the dominant principles of legitimation, the symbolic universe, or the mythological structure are referred to as the master beliefs.
29. The following chart in text emphasizes the dichotomy of these key master
beliefs. The items in the humanistic column obviously are primarily normative in
contrast to the items in the imperial column, which are both normative and empirical.
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Key Master Beliefs in
Imperial Consciousness (continued)

Key Master Beliefs in
Humanistic Consciousness (continued)

form to societal institutions and authorities.

societal institutions and authorities
which foster humanistic norms and
to resist those institutions and authorities which violate humanistic norms.

8. Traditional philosophy should be
used mostly to rationalize existing
cultures, institutions, and norms.

Philosophy should provide a basis for
assessing fundamental premises; it
should be a critical philosophy.

9. Education should inculcate youth
in the available norms, roles, and
opportunities; it socializes youth to
respect existing institutional arrangements.

Education should foster human realization by assisting youth to live authentic
moral lives in the community and to
develop a critical consciousness about
themselves, the institutions, and the
culture.

10. Traditional psychologies and sociologics present conformist self-identities and criteria for self-esteem.

Psychologies and sociologies which foster human realization by helping individuals to overcome inner and outer
barriers should be stressed.

11. The criminal law should be primarily directed against dissidents and
crimes committed by the poor.

The criminal law should be directed
equally against the powerful and powerless, against the crimes of the rich, the
middle class, and the poor.

12. Competing interests and values
should be resolved by balancing.

Competing interests and values often
should be resolved by value ranking according to humanistic principles.

13. Justification should be on a meansends basis in which the ends justify
means and the means are seen as
separate from ends.

Initial and intermediate stages are as
important as ends of processes. Justification should occur at each stage.
Means are ends in themselves.

14. Theories and concepts, if considered valid, are viewed as essentially objective, value-free, and
neutral.

Theories and concepts inherently have
political, social, and ethical implications.

15. Social research is objective, neutral, and value-free.

Social research inherently reflects values, interests, and ideologies.

16. Social research should focus on the
problems of people who do not
meet society's expectations (e.g.,
poor, offenders, Blacks, Hispanics,
workers, and women).

Social research should investigate the
rich and powerful as well as the powerless (e.g., executive, legislative, judicial, corporate, and professional behavior).

17. Social policy should be determined
by pragmatic research to determine
what works.

Pragmatic measures should be subordinate to a humanistic political, social,
and ethical framework.
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Key Master Beliefs in
Imperial Consciousness (continued)

Key Master Beliefs in
Humanistic Consciousness (continued)

18. Traditional theology and morality
should foster conformity to the
status quo.

Humanistic theology and morality
should provide a basis for judging the
status quo and for presenting the
higher spiritual and moral possibilities
of human existence.

19. Truth is viewed as defined in scientific and intellectual terms. Verification is the criterion of truth.

Truth is viewed as primarily an ethical
verification
imperative.
Empirical
should be distinguished from ethical
truth. An ethical approach to truth
should not be subordinated to scientific
verification.

This article assesses these contrasting imperial and humanistic
master beliefs. It demonstrates that each set of master beliefs is
derived from a selective use of knowledge and methodology. The
article details implications of the contrasting master beliefs for the
theory and practice of deterrence and retribution and for the criminal law's role in support of the status quo. Master beliefs derived
from philosophy, theology, politics, psychology, and sociology can
be means of human domination or means of human liberation. The
need is for choice. In the words of Edmond Cahn:
If, as we are assured, everything depends on and varies with the
point of view, then the point of view, the angle of vision, the
chosen perspective necessarily becomes the most decisive factor
in the formulation of responsible judgment. If everything depends on the point of view, we are under a pressing need to
select the best, wisest and most enlightened among available

points of view. If everything depends on the point of view, one
of the prime tasks of legal philosophy is to examine diverse
points of view, contrast their respective implications for a free

society, and indicate the point of view that intelligent judges
30
may esteem and just judges may adopt.
The choice is fundamental: A humanistic approach rests on a
different philosophical framework from which could emerge a different consciousness, a new conception of role, and a radical reconstruction of justification, policy, and practice-in short, an important step towards a new criminal law jurisprudence.
Part One of this article contrasts the imperial metaphysical,
epistemological, and ethical presuppositions underlying the princi30.

Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1963).
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pal justifications of punishment with humanistic presuppositions.
Part Two presents a critique and assessment of the humanistic
thinking of Heidegger. Part Three presents a humanistic critique of
general deterrence within its framework of utilitarian philosophy.
Part Four critiques Kantian, Hegelian, and contemporary retributive theories. Finally, Part Five outlines a humanistic theory of
criminal law.
PART I
IMPERIAL AND HuMANISTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS

An Imperial Metaphysics and Ethics
A fundamental and traditional ontological view underlies criminal law theory and the dialectic of the modern advocates. In this
view, social reality tends to be fixed, composed of predetermined
structures. Human nature, social institutions, norms, and morality
are all given this status. They are not provisional, contingent, and
evolving; rather, they are identified with reality-"being"-in the
most profound and fixed sense. They are reified. A closely-related
theory of value identifies this ontological position with the valid or
the good. What is is what should be. What is real is also what is
good. Thus, existing institutions, norms, morality, and definitions
of human nature take on special status: They are identified with
3
transcendent being and value. '
Imperial ontology and axiology require a highly reified mode
of consciousness, that is, "the apprehension of the products of
human activity as if they were something else than human
products-such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will." Identifying "society," "'social interests,"

31. As to why we reify, there is insight in Ernest Becker's suggestion that we
seek to transcend our mortality through culture-building: "[AII those who join together under one banner are alike and so qualify for the privilege of immortality; all
those who are different and outside that banner are excluded from the blessings of
eternity." E. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL 113 (1975) (footnote omitted).

The thing that makes man the most devastating animal that ever stuck his
neck up into the sky is that he wants a stature and a destiny that is impossible for an animal; he wants an earth that is not an earth but a heaven, and
the price for this kind of fantastic ambition is to make the earth an even
more eager graveyard than it naturally is.
Id. at 96. If we seek immortality through culture, reification of culture is an imperative. We shall die as individuals, but we shall live on in our membership in a particular ideological, ethnic, religious, social, or party grouping.
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"human nature," "moral codes of society," and the "legal system"
with transcendent being and value reinforces imperial interests.3 2
What is is seen as not simply rooted in humankind's past and present activity. Social reality is not seen as a human product. An
existing social reality, a particular arrangement of human existence,
is transformed into the "social order," which "appears to merge
with the world of nature . . . necessity and fate." 33 The "basic
recipe for this reification" is to "bestow" on the social order an
ontological status independent of human activity and signification.
What is forgotten is that the "social order exists only as a product
of human activity" and "no other ontological status may be ascribed
to it without hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations." 3 4
However, this obfuscation of the human authorship of current social arrangements, including the "legal system," is essential to the
imperial identification of what is with transcendent being and
value.
More concretely, no distinction is made between social reality
and, for example, biological and astronomical reality. Yet such a
distinction is of critical importance. What we think about social reality (e.g., a Marxist vision of society), if supported by powerful
social forces (e.g., the Communist Party and military, political, and
economic structures), may be embodied in a concrete social reality
(e.g., the Soviet Union or Communist China). But if our vision is
that the world is flat, it does not make the world flat; if we believe
the universe circles around the earth, such belief does not change
the path of the planets; if we believe that earthquakes do not exist,
such belief does not eliminate them. A social reality is different
precisely because it is a continuing human product, while the stars
and earthquakes possess a different ontological status.
Any social reality (e.g., the Soviet Union, Communist China,
or the United States) is strengthened and justified by identifying
itself with Nature, Cosmic Laws, Divine Will, or the Laws of History. More specifically, imperial interests which benefit most from
current forms and modes of social organization have a stake in the
confusion of social reality with other forms of reality. The confusion
strengthens the political power of dominant interests. The individual is dwarfed by the reified status quo structures: He or she is
32.

P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, TnE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 89

(1966).
33. Id. at 90-91.

34. Id. at 90.
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an object of these structures, not a creator of them. A criticism is
then viewed not simply as a social and political polemic: It can be
construed as a slight against God, or against the requirements of
History, Cosmic Laws, or Nature. Such an interpretation is of particular assistance in justifying practices that are otherwise difficult
to defend, for example, economic, political, cultural, and racial
stratification. 3 5 One is reminded of Aristotle's defense of slavery in
terms of the nature (even the physical characteristics) of slaves; or
of a defense of vicious economic exploitation in terms of natural
economic laws or social Darwinism (i.e., a social version of the
biological idea of survival of the fittest). What is eclipsed in these
reified formulations is the notion of human responsibility for both
beneficial and harmful social policies and practice, and human responsibility for shaping the future in a less destructive mold. How
can humans be responsible for social policies, practices, and the
future, which are rooted in God's Will, in the requirements of Nature, or in the inexorable Laws of History? Political and social issues are transformed to a cosmic reality beyond human accountability. This imperial deception not only fosters acceptance of existing
35.

Ernest Becker suggests that culture, viewed as systems of death denial with

continuing rejection of social justice, inequality of social classes, and state repression
of freedom, leads to internal victimage and to external victimage: "Whatever form of
government uses victimage, the use is still the same: to purify evil social arrangements, distract attention from the failure to solve internal problems." E. BECKER,
supra note 31, at 166. Becker also suggests that guilt is a factor in producing "victimage and scapegoating all across history":
Guilt is a reflection of the problem of acting in the universe; only partly is it
connected to the accidents of one's birth and early experience. Guilt, as the
existentialists put it, is the guilt of being itself. It reflects the selfconscious
animal's bafflement at having emerged from nature, at sticking out too much
without knowing what for, at not being able to securely place himself in an
eternal meaning system....
There is no "harmonious development," no child-rearing program, no selfreliance that would take away from men their need for a "beyond" on which
to base the meaning of their lives. The fallacy of vulgar Marxism was that it
overlooked the depth and universality of the fear of death; Marcuse has remedied this. The other fallacy was to fail to see the naturalness of existential
guilt-and here Marcuse likewise fails. The task of social theory is to show
how society aggravates and uses natural fears, but there is no way to get rid
of the fears simply by showing how leaders use them or by saying that men
must "take them in hand." Men will still take one another's heads because
their own heads stick out and they feel exposed and guilty. The task of
social theory is not to explain guilt away or to absorb it unthinkingly in still
another destructive ideology, but to neutralize it and give it expression in
truly creative and life-enhancing ideologies.
Id. at 158, 162.
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economic, political, and social arrangements but also of their right-

ness and legitimacy.
Mystification and obfuscation of the dominant phenomenal and
normative reality are the principal techniques in this process of
reification. Plato, perhaps the most influential of Western
philosophers, openly advocates their use to implement his utopian
scheme for social organization:
"Now I wonder if we could contrive one of those convenient
stories we were talking about a few minutes ago," I asked, "some
magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to our
whole community, including, if possible, the Guardians themselves?"
"What sort of story?"
"I shall try to persuade first the Rulers and Soldiers,
and then the rest of the community that the upbringing and
education we have given them was all something that happened
only in a dream. In reality they were fashioned and reared, and
their arms and equipment manufactured, in the depths of the
earth, and Earth herself, their mother, brought them up, when
they were complete, into the light of day; so now they must
think of the land in which they live as their mother and protect
her if she is attacked, while their fellow-citizens they must regard as brothers born of the same mother earth."
"We shall," I said, "address our citizens as follows:
'You are, all of you in this land, brothers. But when God
fashioned you, he added gold in the composition of those of you
who are qualified to be Rulers (which is why their prestige is
greatest); he put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in
the farmers and the rest. Now since you are all of the same
stock, though children will commonly resemble their parents,
occasionally a silver child will be born of golden parents, or a
golden child of silver parents, and so on. Therefore the first and
most important of God's commandments to the Rulers is that
they must exercise their function as Guardians with particular
care in watching the mixture of metals in the characters of the
children. If one of their own children has bronze or iron in its
make-up, they must harden their hearts, and degrade it to the
ranks of the industrial and agricultural class where it properly
belongs: similarly, if a child of this class is born with gold or
silver in its nature, they will promote it appropriately to be a
Guardian or an Auxiliary. For they know that there is a
prophecy that the State will be ruined when it has Guardians of

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/1

16

Delaney: Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law: A Humanistic Persp
1978]

HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL LAW

silver or bronze.' That is the story. Do you think there is any
way of making them believe it?"
"Not in the first generation," he said, "but you might succeed with the second and later generations."
"Even so it should serve to increase their loyalty to the state
and to each other. For I think that's what you mean."36
The mystification and obfuscation process for identifying social
reality with a Cosmic Plan or Order or an otherwise exalted ontological status is both explicit and implicit in the writings of many
of the advocates of retribution. Crime, in Morris R. Cohen's words,
is a "violation or disturbance of the divine or moral order. When
Cain kills Abel, the very earth cries for vengeance. The moral
order can be restored, or the violation atoned for, only by inflicting
evil .

. .

. The sentiment of just vengeance or retribution is . . .

deeply grounded in human nature ....37 Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, comparing the passions of vengeance and love, states:
"The forms in which deliberate anger and righteous disapprobation
are expressed, and the execution of criminal justice is the most
emphatic of such forms, stand to the one set of passions in the
same relation in which marriage stands to the other."3 8 For Kant,
the failure to punish for murder results in a "bloodguiltiness . . .
upon the people."3 9 Reification is the common premise underlying
these diverse retributive expressions; punishment has an express or
implicit "ontological status independent of human" choice and signification. 40 Punishment is an imperative of God, of the moral order, of human nature, of the need to restore cosmic equilibrium.
The advocates of deterrence postulate a series of core premises
as givens which are not subject to analysis. These givens, if not
reified, are given an exalted ontological status. The vocabulary used
and the meaning expressed manifest this process: Pound's attribution of exalted status to "civilized society," "social interests," and
the "system of duties"; 4 1 Andenaes's "human natures," "moral
codes of society," and his neat division of humankind into "crimi36. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 159-61 (Lee trans. 1955) (footnote omitted).
37. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1009-10
(1940).
38.
SOCIETY

Stephen, Of Crimes in General and of Punishments, in
17, 23-24 (A. Goldstein & J. Goldstein eds. 1971).

39. Kant, Justice and Punishment, in

CRIME, LAW, AND

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUN-

ISHMENT 102, 106 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
40. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
41. See Pound, supra note 22.
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nals," "potential criminals," and the "law-abiding";4 2 Packer's
image 43
of the criminal process as legitimate "public rituals" and
"rites"; Zimring's "solemn commands of a legal system" and
"loyalty to the parent society"; 44 Henry M. Hart's conformity-oriented
"theory of social justice" stressing "training of an adult in the larger
circle of the community"; 45 and Mark DeWolfe Howe's use of "nature" and "Man's nature" to legitimize the law's "respect" for the
"strong," and his approval of the "law's willingness to allow
a
measure of oppression to prevail." 4 6
The prevailing ethical and moral code for individuals usually
derives from this ontological and axiological position. In simplified
statement, since the individual is defined by existing social structures and norms, his ethical obligation is clear: He must conform to
the roles and duties which these institutions prescribe. The individual derives social value and personal meaning by fulfilling his or
her destiny of subordination and service to existing social forms.
Morality and ethics also are reified or otherwise exalted as givens.
Just as social organization is identified with transcendent being
and value, ethical and moral obligations undergo the same transformation. They too are given an ontological status independent
of human activity and signification. Their human authorship is
obscured. If not reified, existing ethical obligations are given a preferred, a priori status or are otherwise one-sided, a weapon of the
powerful against the weak. John Rawls' A Theory of Justice illustrates a sophisticated form of status quo ethical reasoning. 47 Rawls,
in Peter Singer's words, "thinks that moral philosophy should take
the firmest" of our "moral judgments" as "data" and "unify our
particular intuitions about justice." These moral intuitions are givens and are not subject to "rigorous criticism. "48 Not surprisingly,
Rawls' conclusions justify a society comparable to that which exists
in the United States and say almost nothing about "the demands of
justice in distribution between nation-states." 4 9 There is a circular42.

See Andenaes, supra note 7.

43.
44.

See H. PACKER, THE LIMNTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
See F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (National Institute of Men-

tal Health, Public Health Service Pub. No. 2056 (1971)).
45. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401

(1958).
46.

See Howe, Introduction to O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1963).

47. See J. BAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
48. Singer, PhilosophersAre Back on the Job, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 7, 19.
49. Id.
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ity in the reasoning: It provides brilliant apologetics for the status
quo. What should be a central element to be justified-the "firmest" of our "moral judgments"-becomes a priori "data."
Another example of this ethical approach is contained in the
analysis of the modem advocates of deterrence. Although aware
and troubled by the ethical issues in sentencing the convicted individual on the basis of the threat posed by others,5 0 they overcome
these reservations. With misgivings, they place the burden for controlling crime on the hapless individual offenders who manage to
lose in our lottery system of criminal justice and are convicted of a
crime. This is scapegoatist ethics: The responsibility for crime is
summed up and personified in the punishment of the offenders
who are convicted. All others implicated in the pervasive aggression, violence, and greed in our culture are thereby aided in escaping ethical responsibility. There is a gross reductionism underlying
this scapegoatism; ethics is encapsulated. The rationale given for
this approach is that it is the practical way to control crime, at least
at present. 51 In this thinking, there is not a broad ethical or sociological imagination, or an anthropological or social-psychological imagination, or a moderate political perspective.

50. Andenaes seems particularly troubled by these ethical issues. See Andenaes, supra note 7, at 981-83.
51. Zimring and Hawkins qualify their support for this proposition:
Professor Packer in his The Limits of the Criminal Sanction speaks of
"the inevitability... of punishment." He says, "In our present state of comparative ignorance about the sources and control of human conduct there is
no escape from the use of punishment (whether criminal or not) as a device
for reducing the incidence of behavior that we consider antisocial." Packer
is clearly right, but the history of crime control and penal methods should
warn us that complacent conclusions about inevitability and the assumption
that no alternatives exist have in the past all too often been taken to justify
barbarity and inhumanity.
It may well be that in some instances more effective police work, possibly involving the expansion of police forces, could provide the same or even
better protection for the public than an increase in penalties. Where alternative methods of crime reduction do exist and are not employed, we are in
the even less enviable position of explaining to the offender that his extra
punishment is our method of saving other scarce resources.
F. ZIMRING & G. HAWIUNS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
40-41 (1973) (quoting H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249

(1968)). The notion of crime control alternatives does not extend to concrete political
and social efforts to reduce the violence, greed, and gross inequality embedded in
our culture and institutions. We need a broader conception of crime control possibilities.
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An Imperial Epistemology
The imperial position as to what is real, what is valued, and
what humankind must do, is matched with a preferred epistemological stance as to the character of fact. Fact (as society and
ethics) is given a reified status; epistemology follows ontology. In
traditional cultures, the tendency is to view social facts as a product
of God's Will or Fate. In our culture, the tendency is to view the
source, scope, and nature of social facts as transhuman phenomena
of nature: objective, neutral, and value-free. In both cases, facts
are given a status independent of human activity and signification.
In both cases, humans are subordinate to facts: facts are the master, we the effect. Our role is to recognize their exalted status and
to adjust our hopes, behavior, and demands to accord with them.
With this underlying epistemological stance, there is a compelling argument, usually by implication, that policymaking should be
determined ordinarily by research into the facts. Andenaes, for
example, emphasizes the need to separate empirical questions
about the effectiveness of deterrence from ideological arguments,
so that these questions can be discussed "dispassionately and without bias." 5 2 The assumption is that facts have no ideological context: They are neutral and value-free. Indeed, Andenaes (and other
advocates of deterrence) emphasizes the "neglected" factual "issue": "[T]o what degree, and under what conditions, it is possible
to direct the behavior of citizens by means of the threat of punishment."5 3
The sophisticated modem advocates of deterrence do not
explicitly argue that the resolution of empirical questions provides
the principal basis for policymaking. Yet that is the thrust and effect of their analysis. The discussion of deterrence is characterized
as "in the main quite unscientific. ".54 The "deterrence debate . . .
if not meaningless [is] at least largely irrelevant to any material
concern." 5 5 The emphasis is not on "rhetorical statements" but
"'propositions which could be evaluated on the basis of fact."5 6
It is
verification of facts, not ideological arguments, which offers the potential for answers. The emphasis on verification is not without
concern for the ethical issues. 5 7 These concerns, however, are
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Andenaes, supra note 7, at 954.
Id.
F. ZIMRING & G. HAwKINS, supra note 51, at 2.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 32-50.
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mostly overcome, albeit not without misgivings.
If the social structure is considered a static and fixed world,
then it is likely that social fact also will be seen as static and fixed,
that is, as one of the determined structures. The source, scope,
and status of fact is related to the ontological view. The failure to
distinguish between social being and, for example, biological and
astronomical being is paralleled by a failure to distinguish between
social facts and, for example, biological and astronomical facts. The
distinction is as critical at the level of fact as it is at the level of
ontology. Inquiry into social facts and inquiry into natural science
facts both involve at each stage the impact of "heritage," "culture,"
and "personality." The distinction is not one of objectivity and subjectivity. The distinction is that the social inquiry is aimed at revealing a humanly-created reality while the natural science inquiry
is aimed at revealing a different reality: that, for example, of the
path of the stars, of the cause of earthquakes, or of the components
of DNA. The facts revealed by the first inquiry may reveal the secrets of past and current political and social choices; the facts revealed by the natural science inquiry may reveal some of the secrets
of nature. But the facts of slavery, of the achievements of women, serfs, workers, and aristocrats in particular historical periods are
humanly-created facts, quite different from facts about stars, earthquakes, and DNA. The imperial effort to reify social institutions
is matched by an effort to reify social facts-to obscure their human
origins by imputing social facts with a more exalted status. The
facts of social arrangements assume a more imposing status-facts
of Science or Nature or God's Will.
A Humanistic Metaphysics
A humanistic metaphysics and ethics provide very different
approaches to fundamental questions. 58 Being is not fixed and manifested in a world of determined structures. It is a flux; a continuous, creative process in which humankind plays a critical role.
Being is becoming: Social institutions, norms, morality, and, (to a
startling extent) human nature-and even nature-are an everchanging product of a dynamic and evolutionary process.
58. In this article, there is no effort to provide a ground for the humanistic
enterprise beyond human consciousness and activity. There is no suggested cosmology. From a traditional religious viewpoint, God is the ground. From a secular
viewpoint, humankind alone is the ground. For others, a cosmic design or order of
some sort may provide a ground. The emphasis in this article on human beings providing a ground, out of our experience and struggle, does not preclude a cosmological quest. Such a quest, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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[A]ll things are caught up in this universal surge of constantly
changing reality. We no longer consider things as fixed in their
structure. We speak now in developmental terms; not of cosmos
but of cosmogenesis, not of fixed species but of biogenesis, not of
mankind as a determined reality but of anthropogenesis, for man
is making himself at the same time as he is in a manner making
the world. 59
Julian Huxley, in his introduction to Teihard de Chardin's The
Phenomenon of Man, emphasizes the "absolute necessity of adopting an evolutionary point of view":6 0 "IT]he different branches of
science combine to demonstrate that the universe in its entirety
must be regarded as one gigantic process, a process of becoming,

of attaining new levels of existence and organization, which can
properly be called a genesis or an evolution."6 1 J6se Ortega y Gasset applies this process to men and women and their human nature:
Man does not have a nature, but a history .... Man is no thing,
but a drama. . . .His life is something that has to be chosen,
made up as he goes along, and a man consists in that choice and
invention. Each man is the novelist of himself, and though he
may choose between being an original writer and a plagiarist, he
cannot escape choosing. . . .He is condemned to be free ...
Freedom is not an activity exercised by an entity that already
possessed a fixed being before and apart from that activity. Being
free means . . . being able to be something else than what one is
and not being able to settle down once and for all in any determined nature. . . .Unlike all the other things in the universe
which have a pre-fixed being given to them, man is the only and
almost inconceivable reality that exists without having an irrevocably pre-fixed being. . . .It is not only in economics but
also in metaphysics that man must earn his living ....62
But in which direction should men and women remake themselves and the world? What is the nature of the good to which they
should evolve? What is at any point in the unfolding process of
individual and social life is not automatically equated with what

59. Berry, The Threshold of the Modern World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
57, 58 (Human Energetics Research Institute 1964).
60. Huxley, Introduction to P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF
MAN 12 (1959).
61. Id. at 13.
62. McInnes, Ortega y Gasset, Jos6, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
2, 3-4 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
TEiLHARD CONFERENCE
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should be. Neither the existing social order nor related norms
should be consecrated as an embodiment of the good, which determine one's life and destiny. This process would make absolute a
particular, transient, social, and individual example. It would reject
the concept of a constantly evolving process and would "freeze"
being. A deeper, separate source of moral value is required.
Humanism provides a direction, ground, and context for the endless evolution of humankind and the world. The unfolding of being
centers on the person and humankind: "The central problem of
philosophy is not the abstract relationship of matter and mind but,
rather, the place of man in the world: what is and what ought to
be, his relation to nature and to other human beings and society as
a whole." 63 The adoption of this new focus provides a basis for a
radical conceptual and valuative shift in the meaning and status of
the person, the relationship between the person and society, the
purpose and function of social institutions, and the ethical nature of
the human and social endeavor.
The person assumes center stage. He or she is a subject, an
end. The person provides a ground for theory, values, policy, and
action. The person is no longer seen through the "lens" of one's
role in the traditional social order; no longer sacrificed, as in much
"traditional thought" to "cosmological considerations," the dominant master beliefs, and imperial social interests. He or she cannot
be objectified as a mere utilitarian instrument for a social, economic, and political status quo.
Humanism, however, does not focus only on the individual.
Humans are social creatures who seek fulfillment and meaning in
familial, cultural, economic, religious, political, and other associations. This quest for fulfillment and meaning has physical, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, aesthetic, and economic dimensions.
The person may not be artificially abstracted from the various social
contexts in which he or she achieves realization and meaning. The
individual and collective dimensions of life create conflict. The individual search for fulfillment and meaning may conflict with the
quest of others. While some conflict and tension is inherent and
desirable, humanism provides a framework in which to seek to resolve the conflict creatively. The individual search for fulfillment
and meaning is inseparable from the same quest of others. Each
quest is diminished by the degradation of the other and each is
63.

Markovi6, Yuvgoslav Philosophy, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

359, 363 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
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enhanced by the freedom and justice that others enjoy. No
humanistic individual ideal can be realized in a society characterized by economic and cultural victimization.
The purpose and function of humanistic political, legal, and
ethical structures is to serve humankind. The validity or lack of
validity of these structures and related master beliefs result from
their success or failure in serving humankind's evolving experience,
consciousness, and needs. The person and humankind transcend
what is and only derive personal meaning and social value from
their role in status quo structures insofar as these structures embody a humanistic conception of the person and of society. For
example, Gandhi made clear that he remained loyal to an institution " 'so long as that institution conduce[d] to [his] growth and the
growth of the nation.' Immediately upon finding that the institution
'instead of conducing to its growth impedes it,' he considered it his
'bounden duty to be disloyal to it.' "64 In the words of McDougal
and Lasswell:
Instead of institutional symbols such as "capitalism" versus
"socialism," "territorial" versus "functional" representation, "centralized" versus "decentralized" planning, considered abstractly
and affirmed dogmatically, the focus of attention and debate can
usefully shift to the appraisal of contemporary structures according to their positive or negative impact upon present and prospective value-shaping and sharing.6 5
The basic shift in the relationship between the person (individually
and collectively) and society also flows from an historic change, in
comparatively modem times, in the theory of society. From ancient times until the American and French Revolutions in the
eighteenth century, a theory of a static society prevailed. In the
medieval period, it was characterized by, inter alia: (1) a divine
right for political and social authority; (2) a restoration theme as a
basis for the occasional revolts; (3) a rooting of ideals, justifications,
and utopias in the past, for example, a defense of peasant rebellions by a justification that the earthly lord had violated ancient
traditions and laws; (4) religious conflict (Catholic versus Protestant)
centered on which faction was most traditionally authentic (i.e.,
most Christian); and (5) an economic approach that emphasized no
growth, and detailed economic regulation designed to restrict
64. J. BoNDuRANT, CONQUEST FOR VIOLENCE: THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY
OF CONFLICT 164 (1958) (footnote omitted).
65. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 28, at 29.
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growth. In the traditional theory of society, a core purpose of the
entire social structure was to keep each person in his appointed
groove in society. He was to work out his life through the forms
and modes of social organization available to him, as a serf, a slave,
or whatever. This conception of society, and the relationship of the
individual to it, is embodied in the medieval view of the world:
The fundamental institutions of the medieval world-the empire,
the church, and feudalism-seemed to be the guardians of a
cosmic order which man had to accept but which he could not
modify to the slightest degree. They worked primarily to show
that all the material and spiritual goods to which man can aspire
(from daily bread to truth) derive from the order to which he
belongs, that is, the hierarchies which are the interpreters and
custodians of the cosmic order. 66
The humanistic idea of the primacy of the person shatters this
traditional conception of society. Fundamental institutions have a
different purpose, function, and basis. Social structures can no
longer legitimately be organized on the principle that reified structures reflect the cosmic order and can subordinate and sacrifice the
person to the needs of dominant social institutions and groups. Instead, society should be organized on the principle of serving the
individual, group, and community. The individual would no longer
be viewed in terms of his status in a particular social order. What
is important is the fact that he is a human being.
The change in the legal status of the person parallels the
change from a traditional to a humanistic conception of society and
the individual. In the traditional legal relationship between the
person and society, organized on the principles of distinct hereditary castes, the rights of persons flowed from their status as serfs,
nobility, clergy, and the like. This concept shifted to the modem
democratic and humanistic idea that our rights flow from our common status as human beings. In traditional society, a core theme of
the legal system is to "keep man in his appointed groove in society" in order that he serve society. In a democratic society with a
commitment to what Joel Feinberg has called the "revolutionary
idea of equal human rights," 67 civil and political rights are no
longer grounded in the fixed roles of the traditional social order.
The substitution of this new ground of our common status as
66. Abbagano, Humanism, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
Edwards ed. 1967).
67. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 88-89 (1973).
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human beings helps to liberate human rights from bondage to
status quo "forms and modes." The meaning of status quo legal and
other social structures is transformed: In traditional language, they
become means to achieve equal civil and political rights, not ends
in themselves. The raison d'etre of these structures would be to
serve the individual and humankind. The Declaration of Independence provides a striking formal example of this approach. After
holding "that all men are created equal" and have "unalienable
rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," the
Declaration states:
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed,-That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute new Governments, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness. 68

Edmond Cahn expresses a humanistic interpretation of the statement "that all men are created equal" in stressing its civil and
political dimensions as well as its social and economic implications:
As any literate person understands, when Thomas Jefferson
wrote in the American Declaration of Independence that "all
men are created equal,"

. .

. [h]e was not formulating a principle

of biological science but a working maxim of public action. The
free man's fundamental right is to be treated equally in all political and legal transactions.
This right is incontestable as far as it goes but it does not go
nearly far enough; for of what practical value are political and
legal equality to a man who has no bread to eat, no clothes to
wear, no roof to shelter him, no chance to earn a livelihood? A
man must eat before he can discuss public affairs rationally, must
have an opportunity for employment under decent conditions for
a living wage before he can vote intelligently, and must have a
modicum of rest, leisure, and psychic 69security before he can
hold office worthily in a free community.
Equal human rights should include two broad categories of
rights, civil and political rights and social and economic rights. The
broad statement of human rights, "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
68. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
69. E. CAHN, supra note 4, at 115-16.
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Happiness," leads to a democratic specification which includes civil
and political rights to due process, free speech and press, and free
exercise of religion, petition, and assembly. A humanist specification, however, also emphasizes human rights in social-economic
terms: the right to a job, to food, to medical care, to housing, to
education, to clean air, to a pension, to assistance in the event of
disability or sickness or death of a parent or mate.
Both categories of rights are necessary to realize ideals of
human dignity and worth as well as privacy, self-determination,
and self-realization. Indeed, both categories of rights can easily be
viewed as included within (and necessary to) the attainment of the
broader statement of rights in the Declaration, at least from a
humanistic perspective. Andrei Amalrik, an activist in the Human
Rights Movement in the Soviet Union, emphasizes that both
categories of rights are "inseparable":
[M]an has not only a stomach but also a head and a heart ....
A slave who has eaten his fill retains the psychology of a slave if
he has never thought about freedom while he was hungry. If you
respect hungry human beings, you should not only feed them
but also convey to them a sense of their human dignity. Unless
these two processes progress hand in hand, we shall live in a
monstrous world. 70
The actualization of equal human rights, while a sine qua non
for a humanistic community, is insufficient. We do not live by
rights alone. The ideal of equal human rights does not address the
question of what we are to do with these rights. Although clearly
valuable in themselves, we still confront the issue of what vision
of life we mean to serve with these rights beyond the ideal of
equality. Equal civil and political rights often has meant equal
rights to aggrandize wealth, privilege, and power so as to victimize
the poor and powerless and perpetuate actual inequality. Such an
exercise of equal rights fosters greed and domination which violates
the most basic ethical principles in a humanistic approach. An emphasis on equal human rights must be complemented with an emphasis on ethical principles in the exercise of those rights and on
the creation of a culture of humanistic ethics as a guiding
framework (a subject beyond the scope of this article). Together,
the realization of equal human rights in a culture of humanistic
70. Amalrik, By Bread Alone? A Well-Fed Slave is a Well-Fed Slave, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1977, at 33, col. 2.
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ethics could result in the creation of a social life in which our endemic competition, aggression, and alienation are replaced with
cooperation, community, and fraternity. Amalrik denounces the
liberal ideal of "leave me alone and I will leave you alone" as a
breeder of loneliness and alienation. "People don't want to be left
alone. They want others to care for them. They want something to
be asked of them. They want something to be given to them. The
knowledge that nothing in the world depends on you is a difficult
71
burden to bear."
To be sure, the substitution of a humanistic basis for the
specified human rights does not define their content or resolve
many basic conflicts in definition, interpretation, and application.
But this substitution provides a basis for liberating human beings
from the clench of status quo social forms and establishes a perspective for definition, interpretation, and application. In provides
goals, objectives, and criteria for beginning to assess existing social
institutions, norms, and morality, including the legal system. In
the words of McDougal and Lasswell:
It is . . . feasible . . . to dissolve the curtains of confusion
created by the common practice of glorifying specific institutional
practices instead of glorifying the goal values of human dignity
and engaging in a continuous reappraisalof the circumstances in
which specific institutional combinations can make the greatest
72
net contribution to the over-archinggoal.
In a fundamental sense, a series of new and different questions
reflect the basic change in framework. The transformed status of
existing social forms is presupposed in such questions as: To what
extent do these social forms exemplify equal human rights in goal
and objective? To what extent do they provide for fulfillment of
human potential in cultural and personal realms? Traditional ideas
of the status of the individual and of the relationship between the
individual and society are clearly reformulated.
In discussing human rights and systems of world order,
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen express this shift from traditional to
humanistic formulations:
[W]e would emphasize that the animating conception of any international law of human rights is, at its core, a humanistic world
view: a conception of the human being as an end in himself and
71.
72.

Id.
McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 28, at 5 (emphasis in original).
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a legitimator of power and not as an instrument of a corporate
society, deriving his right to existence from that society ....
The Enlightenment's reinstatement of the individual as of central
basic constitutive
concern has only now begun to reshape 7the
3
structures of the world process of decision.
This shift in perspective applies not only to society's goals and
objectives. Most tyrants preach laudable ends. The new perspective is not only end-focused, but is existential. It applies to living
persons in all their day-to-day social interactions-to the policies,
pressures, norms, methods, and techniques that they and social institutions exemplify. It provides a separate value basis for assessing
these societal means as well as societal goals and objectives.
To those well-molded by status quo socialization and experience, this vision of the person and of social institutions is utopian
and largely unrelated to the practicalities of the real world. But is
it more practical and realistic to continue with the traditional status
quo consciousness, structure, and practice that have resulted in 50
million dead in twentieth-century wars; the Holocaust; about $300
billion spent worldwide annually for militarism; institutionalized
racism and sexism; and extensive economic, political, and social
exploitation? Is it practical to continue on a path that threatens
atomic and nuclear proliferation and war, increasing world starvation, and destruction of the environment (including depletion of
the world's natural resources)? One is reminded of C. Wright
Mills's phrase, "crackpot realism," a practicality and realism that is
mindless and that may result in disaster. The specter of this horror
is raised in a recent report to the Club of Rome on World Resources and Growth in which the industrialized countries are urged
to limit their own use of finite resources and help other countries
out of poverty: "Unless this lesson is learned in time, there will be
a thousand desperados terrorizing those who are now rich, and
eventually nuclear blackmail and terror will paralyze further orderly development."7 4 Even assuming that the affluent can insulate
themselves from the "thousand desperados" in a garrison state, the
moral, social, and economic price of such insulation creates its own
specter of horror. From this vision of the unfolding future, it is
easy to argue that a reconstruction of national and world structures
is a sine qua non of self-interest and practicality as well as a re73. McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A
Frameworkfor Policy-OrientedInquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 237, 269 (1969).
74. CLUB OF ROMiE, REPORT ON WORLD RESOURCES AND GROWTH (1977).
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quirement of any decent moral sense. The status quo interpretation
of what is practical and what is realistic would be reversed. The
myth and moral framework of humanism is a requirement of our
historical evolution and of our contemporary experience. It is myth
and moral framework whose time has come and without which the
time of humankind may be limited. In Amalrick's words: "I believe
that everyone who values freedom is confronted by the problem of
creating a new ideology which will transcend both liberalism and
Communism and make its central issue the indivisible rights of
man ....
I am for an ideology of humanism." 75 If we confront our
history, acknowledge that we are the creators and recreators of the
political and social world, we are compelled to take responsibility
for what we have wrought, including authoritarian and totalitarian
systems: monarchy, feudalism, fascism, Leninism and Stalinism,
and exploitative capitalism. If we have created these destructive
myths and ideologies and embodied them in structures of domination, we can also create humanistic myths and ideologies and embody them in structures of liberation.
A Humanistic Ethics
On a personal ethical level, a humanistic approach to what is
real and what is valued leads to a rejection of conventional adjustment ethics and to a redefinition of the individual and social endeavor. Traditionally, the conventional ethical question of what a
person should do was answered by one's role in the social structure
as well as by its norms. One's duty was to conform to preexisting
patterns and not to move beyond them. Ethics meant adjustment
to the existing embodiments of what is real and what is good. But
if existing social structures and norms are a transient manifestation
of evolving being and if the source of value and purpose is a
humanistic myth of humankind and society, the foundation for adjustment ethics collapses. Mere automatic conformity to existing
roles and norms at a particular historical juncture is unacceptable.
It is to deny the evolving idea of being, to reject the humanistic
ground for humankind and society, to seek to immortalize a moment in historical evolution. These roles and related normative
rules become issues for ethical analysis, not grounds for ethical
analysis. In existential terms, to succumb to conformist ethics is to
lose one's authenticity, one's "personhood," one's chance for a selfcreated freedom. In religious terms, it is to engage in idolatry.
75. Amalrik, supra note 70, at 33, col. 2.
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Worst of all, automatic conformity denies human ethical responsibility for social institutions and culture, including responsibility for the very roles which provide the ground for conventional
ethical obligation. We must recognize that human beings are accountable for the ethical values that exist: We are the authors and
the legitimizers. We are responsible for choosing our values and for
incorporating them in personal and social realms. We must provide
the direction and purpose for evolving being and foster the evolution by our life work which cannot be only a personal odyssey.
"Just as in the past, he was judged to betray his personhood if he
ceded to a life of instinct, so now the same condemnation is levelled against him if he merely accepts the social order he finds and
76
makes no attempt to better it."
Humanists link the realm of ethics to social, economic, and
political contexts. The ethical obligation owed by the individual to
society and its institutions, policies, and practices is contingent
upon their validity. Humanism provides a framework for formulating and analyzing that validity. Sometimes the determination of
that validity poses complex and subtle questions; sometimes the
analysis and conclusions are clear: bombing and strafing civilians in
"free fire" zones in Vietnam; or collectively retaliating against an
anticolonial populace in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia. Individually and collectively, we bear responsibility for our individual
acts and for those acts committed in our name.
In humanistic ethics, there is a basis for a fundamental challenge to central societal techniques of legitimization and denigration. Scapegoatist ethics is rejected. The responsibility for grave
defects in our culture and institutions-for example, schools which
do not teach, an economic system which leaves millions unemployed, and a culture which glorifies greed-lies not with those
who are the victims of these failures, for example, the unemployed. 77 The rejection of scapegoatist ethics means, too, that the
responsibility for crime cannot be summed up and personified in the
punishment of convicted offenders. Individuals should not be used
to remedy problems whose nature and scope go to the heart of our
society. Encapsulated ethics leads to encapsulated sociological and
criminological formulations focused on the individual. A broader
ethical imagination, reflecting the insights, for example, of Mer76. Johann, Teilhard's Personalized Universe, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TEILHARD CONFERENCE 93, 105 (Human Energetics Research Institute 1964).
77. See generally W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971).
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ton 78 or Kiing, 79 leads to a broader sociological, anthropological
or social-psychological imagination, or a combination of them. With
a broader perspective, there is a different context for asking questions about the crime control potential of legal institutions.8 0 Reductionist formulations are seen as a requisite of scapegoatist
ethics, a prime support for an unjust status quo.
From a religious perspective, Hans Kiing offers a challenge to
status quo ethical reasoning:
This means that service to man has priority over observance of
the law. No norms or institutions can be made absolute. Man
may never be sacrificed to an allegedly absolute norm or institution. Norms and institutions are not simply abolished or annulled. But all norms and institutions, all laws and precepts,
edicts and statutes, regulations and ordinances, dogmas and decrees, codes and clauses, must be judged by the criterion of
whether they exist for man or not. Man is the measure of the
law. In the light of this, is it not possible critically to discriminate between what is right and what is wrong, what is essential
and what is irrelevant, what is constructive and what is destructive, what is good or bad order?
God's cause is not law, but man. Man himself therefore replaces a legal system that has been made absolute. Humanity
replaces legalism, institutionalism, juridicism, dogmatism. Man's
will, it is true, does not replace God's will. But God's will is
made concrete in the light of the concrete situation of man and
his fellow men. 8
A Humanistic Epistemology
Flogging slaves, prisoners, or workers may well have been effective in enforcing the will of the slavemaster, the warden, or the
employer. The proposition that flogging achieves the desired result
may be verified. The slaves may become submissive, the prisoners compliant, the workers productive. The proposition is true in
the sense that it is factually verified. At least three issues are raised
by these facts and this truth.
The first is the impact of the underlying perspectives in per78. See, e.g., T. MERTON, CONFESSIONS OF A GUILTY BYSTANDER (1968).
79. See, e.g., H. KONG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN (E. Quinn trans. 1976).
80. For an example of question-asking on a broader scale, see I. TAYLOR, P.
WALTON, & J. YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DE-

VIANCE 268-82 (1973).
81.

H. KONG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN 252-53 (E. Quinn trans. 1976).
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ceiving, selecting, and categorizing these facts into conclusions. It
is evident that we are looking at the facts through the lens of the
slavemaster, the warden, and the employer.82 The perspectives
manifest the values and interests of the slavemaster, the warden,
and the employer in relation to submissive slaves, compliant prisoners, and productive workers. The perspectives are related not
only to the values and interests of those on top but also to their
power. They have the power to exemplify their perspectives in
practice-to create the fact of flogging for violations of their rules.
Impeccable scientific research could be utilized in evaluating this
application: for example, how much flogging is required to secure
obedience from various types of violators? Perceiving, selecting,
and categorizing these facts into conclusions is not a neutral,
value-free process. The nature of this process is immediately apparent if we look through the lens of the slaves, the prisoners, and the
workers. They have a different perspective which manifests their
interests and which leads to contrasting perceptions. It is more difficult, however, for them to actualize their perspective into facts in
relation to their victimizers, for they lack a critical element: power.
Gunnar Myrdal expresses the role of value and interest in
looking at facts:
This implicit belief in the existence of a body of scientific
knowledge acquired independently of all valuations I soon found
to be naive empiricism. "Facts do not organize themselves into
concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed, except
within the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific facts but only chaos. There is an inescapable a priori element in all scientific work. Questions must be asked before answers can be given. The questions are all expressions of our
interest in the world; they are at bottom valuations. Valuations
are thus necessarily involved already at the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical analysis, and not only at the
stage when we draw political inferences from facts and valua83
tions."
82. It is helpful to keep in mind the words of the philosopher W.V. Quine:
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of
geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric .... " Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in 3 PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 102, 118-19 (W. Barrett & H.
Aiken eds. 1962).
83. G. MYRDAL, OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 9 (1969) (quoting Preface to

G.

MYRDAL, THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC
THEORY at ix-xvi (1954)).
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In analyzing deterrence, Andenaes emphasizes the "neglected"
factual "issue": "[T]o what degree, and under what conditions, it is
possible to direct the behavior of citizens by means of the threat of
punishment."8 4 The question is highly ideological: It involves a
political and social choice, and the facts gathered reflect the values
included in the question. Initially, the perspective underlying the
question is authoritarian. The transparent point is that it is highly
ideological to pose an "empirical" question about directing behavior
by threat of punishment. Related empirical questions about the degree to which the direction of behavior is possible and the requisite
"conditions" for such direction (as well as questions about control
and prevention) are equally ideological. At an extreme, Nazi officials directed these questions to at least five million foreign workers in German industry and the tens of millions in Nazi-occupied
territories. Their response: a terroristic general deterrence.8 5 Nazi
researchers could systematically gather facts about the effectiveness
of this response as applied in various factories and diverse occupied
territories. There is nothing neutral or value-free about the research: It serves Nazi interests against the interests of other
peoples.
This example is extreme but hardly unique: The question is
being asked-and answered-by white South Africans who continue to subjugate the black population, and it surely was a focus of
American intervention in Vietnam. 8 6 In these instances, too, facts
84. Andenaes, supra note 7, at 954.
85. Referring to control of the millions of foreign workers in Germany, Himmler
stated: "They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures at the
merest trifles." Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, reprinted in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION (1947). Referring to

control of "disorder" in the occupied portions of the Soviet Union, Keitel said: "[A)
human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect can be obtained only by unusual severity." Id. at 63.
86. As Telford Taylor quotes a United States Marine Corps "Ultimatum to Vietnamese People": "'The U.S. Marines will not hesitate to destroy immediately, any
village or hamlet harboring the Vietcong.'" Another Marine leaflet "informed the
inhabitants that their village 'was bombed because you harbored Vietcong' and 'will
be bombed again if you harbor Vietcong in any way.'" T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND
VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 144 (1970). Taylor summarizes the techniques of

American terror:
forced resettlement of millions of rural families with utterly inadequate provision for their health and human dignity; complicity in the torture of prisoners by our wards, the South Vietnamese; enthusiasm for body counts overriding the laws of war on the taking of prisoners; devastation of large areas
of the country in order to expose the insurgents; outlawry of every visible
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could be systematically gathered and analyzed by researchers utilizing sophisticated techniques (e.g., interviews, observation, and use
of experimental and control groups), but this research is not neutral
or value-free.
The second issue is the ground and status of these facts of
flogging. The slavemaster, the warden, and the employer ordered
the floggings-they had the power to create these facts and the
consequent facts of pain, fear, and compliance by those flogged and
by those intimidated. These facts originated in the slavemaster's
mind in the idea that flogging could be effective. This idea is actualized by the flogging; the facts are the externalization of the
slavemaster's idea. The cuts, the blood, the scars, and the terror
have incontrovertible factual reality. These facts also have a valuative element. They operationalize the values and interests of the
systems of slavery, prison, and work. They are grounded in these
systems. The facts themselves are not neutral or value-free. These
facts-and the verified truth of their effectiveness--do not reveal
the laws of Nature (or Fate or God's Will). They reveal the lawsand power-of the slavemaster, the warden, and the employer.
The thesis here is that humans are the fact-makers: We create
political and social facts by our political and social choices. These
facts materialize the values inherent in such choices. These facts
include values and hence have a "subjective" element. Empirical
questions are also "ideological arguments." This epistemological
stance reflects the ontological position: If culture and institutions
are a human product, it is only a corollary to maintain that the facts
of that cultural and institutional web are a human product too. If,
in contrast, culture and institutions are reified (e.g., viewed as a
part of nature), it follows that the facts will be reified (e.g., viewed
as a manifestation of nature). It is a consistent and logical step,
then, to hold that such facts are neutral and value-free (e.g., as
nature is neutral and value-free). The conclusion follows inescapably: "Empirical questions" are the core questions and should be
carefully separated from ideological arguments.
If, however, one views facts not as a product of nature but as
arising from the interaction of people in humanly-created culture
and institutions, empirical questions cannot be separated from
human being in the free-fire zones; slaughter of the villagers of Son My
even to the infants-in-arms.

Id. at 152.
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ideological questions. As social structures exemplify particular values and related theories (e.g., czarist or Leninist, feudal or capitalist, monarchist or democratic), the facts arising in these frameworks exemplify these values too. Such facts must be rooted in an
historical epoch, a political and social fabric. They must be historicized, politicized, and socialized. The point is not the valuable insight that values are operative in the observation and categorization of facts and in the drawing of inferences from them, but that
the facts themselves have an element of value. In Ernst Cassirer's
words:
[W]e find immediate confirmation of Goethe's saying: "the highest thing would be . . . to recognize that everything factual is
itself theoretical." There is no such thing as a sheer facticity, as
an eternal and immutable datum: on the contrary, what we call a
fact must always be theoretically oriented in some way, must be
seen in reference to a definite conceptual system, which implicitly determines it. The theoretical means of determination
are not subsequently added to the sheer fact but enter into the
87
definition of the fact itself.
With this insight, the dichotomies between empirical and
ideological, and fact and value collapse.88 Instead of these
dichotomies, there is substituted a continuum from the abstract to
the concrete. Values and ideology are constructs of the world of
ideas. They can also be exemplified in the world of fact. Values and
ideology, if supported by political and military force, produce not
only cultural and institutional structures but also an accompanying
world of fact (e.g., the facts of Maoist China, Franco's Spain, or the
neo-capitalist West). In contrast, if we believe that we can accomplish the physically impossible, such belief cannot lead to the creation of corresponding facts that empirically verify the beliefs. 89 The
niature of the realities addressed vary: They have different ontological essences. Humans are not fact-makers in these areas in the
ways in which we are in the sphere of the political and the social. 90
87. E. CASSIRER, 3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS:
THOUGHT 409 (R. Manheim trans. 1957).

MYTHICAL

88. The dichotomy of objective and subjective collapses, also, if what is meant
is that the objective is neutral and value-free in contrast to the subjective. The
dichotomy is valid, however, if what is meant is that the objective has external reality in contrast to a feeling or a thought (an internal reality).
89. This distinction is not itself what it appears to be, see, e.g., J. PEARCE,
EXPLORING THE CRACK IN THE COSMIC EGG (1974).
90. Scientific facts have a social element also. Science itself is not a transhuman
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The third issue relates to the relationship between empirical
verification and policymaking. Policymaking is viewed as essentially
normative in character, because the objects of policymakingculture and institutions-are themselves the embodiment of values.
It is impossible to have a value-free analysis of a normative reality.
Nevertheless, empirical research can be vitally important in clarifying the effects of current policy and in estimating the possible effects of the adoption of different policies. Thus, empirical research
is a valuable method for determining policy.
Verifying the facts of the status quo, however, does not establish the validity of the status quo and its techniques. Verifying the
facts of domination and victimization does not establish the validity
of the systems of domination and victimization. 9 1 These facts reveal
a human-made world, not the laws of nature, or Fate, or God's
Will. Facts about the achievements and lack of achievements of
Third World peoples, poor blacks, hispanics, appalachian whites,
and women, are not facts about human nature, innate potential, or
value-free reality. They are facts about politics, power, culture, and
an historical epoch. They are facts about people in diverse social
roles struggling for available opportunities. They are facts about
what peoples are tracked into different paths and facts about a
human-made configuration.
To apply this analysis to Andenaes's question about directing
behavior in contemporary America (or a Western context assumed
by Andenaes), it may be possible to verify the propositions that the
incidence of crime could be reduced among the many unemployed
black school dropouts in central Harlem by severe sentencing
schemes justified on a general deterrence theory; or that execution
of those convicted of murder or rape would reduce violence in our
society; or that making an example of corporate violators would reduce corporate crime; or that life sentences even for possession of
92
small amounts of narcotics would reduce the narcotic problem.
Empirical verification of these propositions, however, does not establish their political and social validity. The propositions would be
true only in the limited sense of being verified. They are not established as true in the sense of the political and social validity reendeavor. It is a changing human product related to a historical period and culture as
well as to successive scientific paradigms. See generally T. KUEHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
91. See, e.g., W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971).

92.

I do not mean to imply that Andenaes or other modem theorists would

necessarily approve of these sentencing schemes.
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quired for policymaking. Such decisions must be made in accordance with acceptable political-social norms and values.
The effect of this argument is not to denigrate empiricism in
favor of armchair analysis. Policymaking is not performed in a
Platonic heaven of ideas. Empirical research can verify that
operationalized policy choices work or do not work and can also
illuminate the potential effectiveness of alternative approaches.
Thus, verification is necessary but not sufficient.
Policymaking cannot be based on policy analysis which postulates the need for a dichotomy between ideological arguments and
empirical questions so that the latter issues "can be discussed dispassionately and without bias." 93 Such a formulation obscures the
nature of both fact and policymaking and the role of fact and norm
in policymaking. The formulation tends to transform issues of justice into issues of fact. It ignores an essential reality: Humans are
the fact-makers; we must, therefore, judge and shape the world of
humanly-created facts and not be objects of it.
PARiT II

A CRITIQUE OF HuMANISM
Humanism does not yet represent a systematic and welldeveloped mode of thinking and action. It is far from this stage in
that it lacks an adequate theory of history, society, science, power,
change and meaning in diverse historical, cultural, economic, and
political contexts. Nor does it have an adequate theory of the relationship between humankind and nature. Although humanistic psychology is advanced, humanistic currents in philosophy, theology,
jurisprudence, sociology, and natural science are quite embryonic.
Compared to Marxist, neo-capitalist, religious, or fascist systems of
thought and action, the coherent and systematic quality of humanism is quite limited. In fact, humanism could be rejected as failing
to meet minimum analytical standards or could even be ridiculed
as an amalgam of pious hopes. However, if the effects of these
more developed systems of thought and action, (i.e., the current
status of the world) are considered, is there not fundamental doubt
as to their value?
From this standpoint, the analytical weakness of humanism is a
spur, not a barrier, to clarify thinking and action. The failures of
93.

Andenaes, supra note 7, at 954.
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traditional modes of thinking and action cast doubt on the validity
of the criteria used to reject humanism. Is it reasonable to expect
an alternative mode of thinking and action, an embryonic world
view for a faintly perceived future world, to emerge in highly developed form? Does not this very requirement exemplify the thinking that impedes such development so that the criticism is status
quo validating? Humanism, as a mode of thinking and acting, will
be refined in the ongoing process of analysis and action, a process
which is not only intellectual but is also a continuing, existential
process of humankind remaking itself and the world in a crucible of
world problems, crises, and opportunities. The worth of humanism
does not depend only on its development into a highly developed
analytical form. That may or may not occur. Nevertheless,
humanistic thinking could be increasingly influential in a variety of
theoretical and material structures by providing an initial
framework for formulation, analysis, and action. This framework
can be described as a perspective, a ground, an angle of vision, a
direction for thinking and action. Its value is in its insistence that
thinking and action be rooted in and justified by their impact on
humankind, far different from the situation described by Emerson:
"Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind."
Perhaps the most searching critical issue about humanism is
raised by Heidegger's rejection of humanism as incomplete and
rootless, since it leaves unasked and unanswered the question in
what man's humanity is to be rooted. Heidegger presents a fundamental metaphysical issue:
[T]he humanistic interpretations of man as animal rationale, as
"person, or as an intellectual, spiritual, corporeal, being, are
not declared wrong, nor rejected. The only thought is rather that
the highest humanistic determinations of the essence of man do
not yet come to know the authentic dignity of man. In this the
thinking in Sein und Zeit runs counter to humanism. But this
opposition does not mean that such thinking would make common cause with the opposite of the human and espouse the in-

human, defend inhumanity and degrade the dignity of man.
Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of
94
man high enough.

To note that different humanists root man's humanity in different
sources-for example in God, or in science, or elsewhere-does
94.

Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in 3 PHILOSOPHY
270, 281 (W. Barrett & H. Aiken eds. 1962).

IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTuRY
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not end the metaphysical quest for the source of human dignity.
But the task of finding a sufficient moral base for the reconstruction
of criminal law theory and practice does not require the resolution
of this fundamental metaphysical issue. The quest is different and
the pluralistic base could be a sufficient foundation for this purpose, at least until a superior alternative is demonstrated. Indeed,
in the world and in highly pluralistic societies, such as the United
States, a humanistic moral framework offers a distinct advantage
precisely because an array of people with disparate ultimate commitments, such as religious people, atheists, and others, can all
substantially support it. This advantage is evident when humanism
is compared to the traditional alternatives of natural law and
positivism, whose basic presuppositions are unacceptable to many.
There is a response to Heidegger's issue which, if not satisfactory on a metaphysical level, is adequate on another level. Social
philosphers have suggested a social policy basis for a humanistic
approach to social life. Joel Feinberg offers a highly pertinent and
useful analysis of grounds for the theory of universal equal human
rights-an analysis that is applicable to a closely related issue: "In
what man's humanity is to be rooted."9 5 Construing Gregory Vlastos, Feinberg suggests that the doctrine of universal equal human
rights presupposes a concept of equal and universal human worth,
independent of human merit, and assumes that at least some basic
rights are "based on the worth human beings have as individuals."96 Humanism also presupposes equal and universal human
worth. Feinberg critically reviews the grounds offered to support
the doctrine of equal and universal human worth. If value characteristics are used (e.g., the worth of humans arises from their "infinite value" or "intrinsic pricelessness") the immediate query is:
"what is the nature and source of these qualities?" 97 If empirical
factors are used (e.g., "man's unique rationality") a grading concept, connecting worth to degree of rationality, is implied.9 8 This
approach is inconsistent with the theory of equal human worth.
Feinberg comments that metaphysical claims such as "men are
ends in themselves" and "men are sacred," 9 9 explain human worth
only by renaming that which is to be explained. Feinberg argues
95. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 37 (1973).
96. Id. at 88-89 (construing Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31
(R. Brandt ed. 1962)).
97. Id. at 91.

98. Id.
99.

Id. at 92.
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that the case for equal and universal human worth may well be
"groundless-a kind of ultimate attitude not itself justifiable in
more ultimate terms."1 0 0 He cites parental love for the child who
has gone bad as "groundless" (i.e., not based on any quality of the
child) but not "irrational or mysterious.' 0 1 He also suggests that
the ground may simply be that "all men equally have a ... unique
angle from which they view the world. They are all equally centers
of experience, foci of subjectivity."' 0 2 This manner of regarding
men may express an attitude toward "each man's person" that is
not "grounded on anything more ultimate than itself, and . . . is
not demonstrably justifiable."' 0 3 Feinberg contends that "a world
with equal human rights is a more just world, . . . a less dangerous
world generally, and one with a more elevated and civilized
tone."' 0 4 Feinberg concludes that "[i]f none of this convinces the
skeptic, we should turn our backs on him to examine more important problems."' 0 5 The skeptic's persistent "why" seems to be
based on two faulty expectations. First, there is, or should be,
some conclusive and demonstrably provable ground for any structure of thought. This is an expectation which belies the reality that
ultimately any such structure (e.g., natural law, positivism, and science itself) is predicated on basic postulates as to preferred conceptions of reality (ontology) and preferred conceptions of fact and
method (epistemology). The second faulty expectation is that the
burden of proof should be with those who postulate human worth.
This expectation ignores the logical option that the burden could
be with those who deny human worth.
The quest for an adequate basis is, in essence, a quest for an
acceptable theory of justification; thus, it questions the adequacy of
available theories of justification. Traditional Western religions offer
a religious ground for human worth (man is made in the image of
God) that is sufficient only for believers. Natural science, a powerful source of legitimacy in the modern world, seems inadequate as
a ground for human worth, which involves a different subject matter than that addressed by natural science. Human worth is a
human construct of moral value rather than a phenomenon of nature whose validity can be empirically measured and studied by
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. (emphasis deleted).
Id.
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scientific concepts and techniques. Status quo "forms and modes"
in each society presuppose a notion of human worth of some sort,
but such notions are inextricably entangled with existing social
interests and master beliefs and are often, therefore, artifacts of the
powerful.
Feinberg's characterization of the "attitude of respect toward
the humanity in each man's person" as "'groundless" ("not
grounded on anything more ultimate than itself")1 0 6 pinpoints the
inadequacy of the traditional theories of justification. All of these
theories manifest a need to find validity in sources outside of
explicit human determination: in God, in nature, in human nature,
in science, or in status quo social structures. Feinberg's point can
be articulated somewhat differently: The ground of "human worth"
is within us. We create social reality. We also create meaning. We
are the ground of being and value-of theory, policy, and action.
The "buck" stops with us.
History, as Feinberg intimates, demonstrates that genocide,
slaughter, and other victimization is accompanied by a rejection of
"the attitude of respect-toward the humanity in each man's person." 10 7 A witness at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg testified about the slaughter of 90,000 men, women, and children, mostly Jews, by one Nazi unit: "I am of the opinion that
when, for years, for decades, the doctrine is preached that the Slav
race is an inferior race, and Jews not even human, then such an
outcome is inevitable." 10 8 Richard Hammer describes the rejection
of "the attitude of respect" towards the Vietnamese by American
soldiers:
And that all of them are something not quite human,
of lower order of creature. You give them names
sonalize them, to categorize them as you've become
they ought to be categorized. They become dinks and
slants and gooks, and you begin to say, and believe,
good dink is a dead dink."'' 0 9

some kind
to deperconvinced
slopes and
"The only

Indians, slaves, freed Blacks, workers, and many other subordinated groups have been characterized as savage and inferior as a
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, reprinted in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 77 (1947).
109. R. HAMMER, ONE MORNING IN THE WAR: THE TRAGEDY AT SON MY 71

(1970).
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means of justifying their subordination. The lesson seems clear: Rejecting the "attitude of respect" is a sine qua non of victimization.
It is easier to kill, plunder, and exploit savages and inferiors; it is
harder to kill, plunder, and exploit men, women, and children who
are respected. Potent human impulses towards sociability and
fraternity must be overcome by ceremonies of degradation which
precede the fact of victimization. Incorporating the "attitude of respect" into a culture of respect is a primordial humanistic priority.
The ground for belief and action is not located so much in verbal
and intellectual acrobatics, but in what we have learned from
thousands of years of human experience and struggle.
PART III
UTILITARIAN PUNISHMENT

UtilitarianThought: A Humanistic Critique
Much of utilitarian thinking is a classic example of imperial
theorizing. Since the utilitarian justification of punishment, particularly general deterrence, emerges from traditional utilitarian
thought, certain aspects of that thought are first critiqued from a
humanistic perspective. This critique is then followed by a critique
of the utilitarian approaches to punishment as expressed in general
deterrence.
In a critique of utilitarian thinking, H.J. McCloskey, a retributivist, argues that such thinking can justify "scapegoat" and
"collective" punishment if they are found to be "useful":
An occupying power which is experiencing trouble with the local
population may find it useful to punish, by killing, some of the
best loved citizen leaders, each time an act of rebellion occurs;
but such punishments do not commend themelves to us as just
and right. Similarly, collective punishment is often useful ....
Collective punishments of the kind employed by the Nazis in
Czechoslovakia-destroying a village and punishing its inhabitants for the acts of a fewv-are notorious as war crimes. Yet they
appear to have been useful in the sense of achieving Nazi objectives.110
In a carefully reasoned response to the McCloskey critique, T.L.S.
Sprigge, a utilitarian, nevertheless, states:
110. McCloskey, A Non-UtilitarianApproach to Punishment, in PHILOSOPICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 119, 127 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
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Consider the type of scapegoat punishment [McCloskey] mentions. It is within the bounds of possibility that a commander
whose chances of victory demanded some sort of cooperation
from the local people, and who had good reason to believe that
without this victory the common good of humanity would suffer,
finding this method of securing the population's cooperation the
only workable one, would rightly consider that it was justified. I
say that it is within the bounds of possibility ....
In saying that such an undesirable means to a desirable end
might possibly on rare occasions be justified, one is not giving
one's general approval to such methods of gaining one's ends ....
..[T]he
[
utilitarian has every reason for urging the serious
damage done to the goods of justice on any likely occasion of
scapegoat or collective punishment, and for insisting therefore on
the extreme gravity of any decision to use them.""
The "commander" in this example could be serving Nazi purposes in occupied Czeckslovakia, France, or Russia; he could be
serving Soviet purposes in occupied Germany or Hungary; or he
could be serving American purposes in Vietnam during the recent
war. All three commanders could determine that the "common
good of humanity" demanded scapegoat and collective punishment
on "rare occasions" and in situations of "extreme gravity." Indeed,
all of these commanders would probably agree that killings of this
nature should be reserved for such occasions. Nazi, Soviet, and
American master beliefs supply a logical, coherent, and internally
valid justification. The master beliefs vary: Nazi beliefs foster the
Hitler myth, saving the world from communism; the Soviet beliefs
foster the Marxist myth, saving the world from fascism; and the
American beliefs in Vietnam foster the democratic myth, saving the
Vietnamese and the world from communism. All three master beliefs provide a conception of "the common good of humanity," a
noble end that justifies such killings. The cited examples are only
illustrations. Nazi utilitarians could justify the massive slaughter of
Jews, and Stalinist utilitarians could justify the slaughter of political, cultural, and other dissidents as well as the Gulag Archipelago;
English utilitarians could justify the firebombing of Dresden; and
American utilitarians could justify the slaughter of innocents in
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Mylai. All may be found to be justified
by their usefulness in serving different conceptions of the "common
111. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTrVES ON PUNISHMENT 66, 75-76 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
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interests of humanity." And, in fact, all were so justified. As four
military utilitarians, sergeants in the U.S. Army in Vietnam, justified the Mylai massacre:
"You know this is a VC village, they are the enemy, they are a
part of the enemy's war apparatus. Our job is to destroy the
enemy, so kill them . . . . [I]f I must kill old men, women or
children2 to make myself a little safer, I'll do it without hesitation.""1

The slaughter and destruction in the twentieth century, this most
barbaric of centuries (which weds malevolence with technology),
is performed in the name of the common good of humanity. Horror
is masked by claims of virtue. What can one say about this mode of
reasoning, this "engine" of imperial "justification"?
First, much of utilitarian philosophy assumes the validity or
good of existing conceptions of utility and of their exemplification
in dominant master beliefs and social structures. Utilitarianism
provides no intrinsic basis for assessing the quality and worth of
existing conceptions of the good. But utility is not a neutral or
objective concept. As illustrated, it derives its meaning from a particular historical, ideological, and material context. In the final
analysis, the particular conception of utility to be enforced is determined by power which has economic, cultural, political, and
legal forms.
As soon as the fantasy view of the world-as unity, harmony,
and justice-is dispelled, the determination of utility is seen as
primarily a political process which fosters particular interests and
which is dependent upon the power of such interests. 1 13 Viewed as
political process, the analytical questions become: utility for whom;
for which social interests; at whose expense; on what rationales;
and with what ramifications for existing realities of power, policy,
and practice?
112. T.

TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMEIucAN TRAGEDY

169

(1970) (footnote omitted).
113. Oppositional conceptions of utility exist too, of course, and can be urged
against the dominant, exemplified conceptions. Naturally, however, the oppositional
conceptions are not exemplified in practice (unless they obtain military and political
support), and it is often difficult to prove their superior value by the facts of the
status quo (which can be viewed as substantially a product of the exemplified dominant conceptions of utility). They seem impractical, speculative, even visionary, in
the way, for example, that the abolition of slavery seemed a bizarre notion from a
slavemaster's perspective. It seems obscuring to formulate conflict as posing contrasting conceptions of utility when what may actually be at stake is competing ideologies, master beliefs, and related interests.
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The particular nature of the presuppositions underlying each
form of utilitarian thought (its political and power dimensions, and
narrow range of thinking) is vividly illustrated in extreme form by
the testimony of the Nazi camp commandant of Auschwitz during
his postwar trial. Eager to demonstrate the efficiencies he had introduced, he stated: "Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we built our gas chambers to accommodate 2,000
people at a time, whereas at Treblinka their gas chambers only
accommodated 200 people each." 114 From a Nazi standpoint, there
is a "clear surplus of value" in the camp commandant's "improvement." On the same theme, a German manufacturer of ovens extolled the efficiency of his product: "We are submitting plans for
our perfected cremation ovens which operate with coal and have
hitherto given full satisfaction . . . . We guarantee their effectiveness, as well as their durability, the use of the best material and
115
our faultless workmanship."
Stated differently, that which is useful depends on whose
criteria of usefulness are employed. These criteria are not unchangeable. They emerge from an underlying, particular framework
of value and social interest (e.g., communism, fascism, capitalism,
Christianity). Hence, it seems more analytically fruitful to assess
the validity and meaning of the particular criteria of value employed in specific historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts. Utilitarian thinking is a sophisticated and valuable analytical
method which can be utilized in any context. Society is not neutral, however, and the dominant master beliefs provide the
framework within which the method is applied.
Traditional utilitarian reasoning tends to sacrifice the dignity
and value of individual human life and human rights to prevailing
conceptions of the common good. Bentham emphasizes this focus
on the common interest in utilitarian thought when he defines a
person as a "partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure,
is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the
community." 116 For the authoritarian and the totalitarian, this sacrifice is axiomatic: The meaning and worth of the individual
emerges from his or her contribution (actual or potential) to the
T. MERTON, CONJECTURES OF A GUILTY BYSTANDER 241 (1968).
115. Id.
116. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
114.

THE UTiLrrARiANS 19 (1961).
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building of the militarist, fascist, or Communist state-an abstraction several levels removed from individual or community happiness. The individual has no intrinsic value apart from this social
contribution. In states with elected parliaments, although the value
and dignity of human life is formally and rhetorically exalted, it is
often subordinated to various other conceptions including a generic
economic good illustrated by the fight against inflation as a basis for
vetoing a job program for the unemployed; a military or political
good illustrated by the fight against communism in Vietnam or by
the need to reassert national power and prestige in the Mayaguez
affair. In addition, the triumph of narrow economic, party, class,
cultural, and regional interests often becomes transformed into the
common interest by democratic master beliefs and processes.
There is thus a secular sanctification of particular interests as the
general good. In this manner, special interest legislation passed by
Congress is postulated as the embodiment of the common good
(e.g., the Internal Revenue Code) and the policy determinations of
individual Presidents (e.g., Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,
and Ford) are similarly presented as the common good (e.g., the
Bay of Pigs and Vietnam). Grounded in dominant master beliefs
and related social structures, authoritarian, totalitarian, and, often,
republican conceptions of the common good are typically antithetical to a humanistic perspective focusing on the value and dignity of
each individual human life and on the primordial importance of
human rights as the ground, the starting point, and the center in
determining public pupose, policy, and practice. Traditional utilitarian thought lacks this humanistic ground and tends to sacrifice
individuals and groups to imperial conceptions of the common
interest. This justification in the name of the common good illustrates the dynamic power and danger of abstract thinking not
grounded in a humanistic foundation.

UtilitarianApproaches to Punishment
The basic differences in premise, purpose, and form between
utilitarian and humanistic thinking extend to approaches to
punishment. Within the utilitarian framework, there is a variety of
approaches. Richard Brandt, who advocates a utilitarian approach
to punishment, explains a typical position:
Traditional utilitarian thinking about criminal justice has
found the rationale of the practice, in the United States, for
example, in three main facts ....
(1) People who are tempted
to misbehave, to trample on the rights of others, to sacrifice pub-
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lic welfare for personal gain, can usually be deterred from misconduct by fear of punishment, such as death, imprisonment, or
fine. (2) Imprisonment or fine will teach malefactors a lesson;
their characters may be improved, and at any rate a personal
experience of punishment will make them less likely to misbehave again. (3) Imprisonment will certainly have the result of
physically preventing past malefactors from misbehaving, during
the period of their incarceration.
In view of these suppositions, traditional utilitarian thinking
has concluded that having laws forbidding certain kinds of behavior on pain of punishment, and having machinery for the fair
enforcement of these laws, is justified by the fact that it
maximizes expectable utility. .... 117
The utilitarian justification of punishment is oriented to a specific theme and purpose: the prevention of crime. For Jeremy
Bentham, the "first object. . . is to prevent, in as far as it is worth
while, all sorts of offenses;"" 8s this principal object is accomplished
by example. Bentham also described "the three inferior objects":
"reformation, disablement and compensation.""19 For Justice
Holmes, prevention is the "chief and only universal purpose" of
punishment.12 0 Given the logical thrust of utilitarian thinking, it is
not startling that individual offenders are sacrificed to a conception
of the common good, and to this path to it. Witness Bentham:
"'ITihe infliction of punishment becomes a source of security to all
. . as an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety.' "121 Consider Justice Holmes: "Public policy sacrifices the individual to the
general good ... "122 and the law "is ready to sacrifice the indi1 23
vidual so far as necessary in order to accomplish that purpose."
His rationale is that "[ilt is desirable that the burden of all should
be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and
murder."' 124 Finally, note the Bentham-like words of J.D. Morton,
former Dean of the Osgoode Law School:
117. Brandt, Rule Utilitarianism, in

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUN-

ISHmENT 93, 93-94 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).

118. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE UTLrrAPuANs 170 (1961).
119. Id. at 184.
120. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 40.
121. See J.D. MORTON, THE FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN 1962, at 19 (1962)
(quoting J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT).
122. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 41.

123. Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 41. The assumption is that punishment is "the only way" or the best
way to end robbery and murder. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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I am suggesting that all these legal tests of culpability or
responsibility can only be understood in terms of finding a suitable object for the purposes of the object-lesson or trial, that is,
one whom the citizens will believe to deserve the punishment
imposed.
"[G]uilty" means "suitable for demonstration purposes"
and that on no other basis can meaning be attributed to the rules
25
governing criminal responsibility.1
Morton believes this demonstration is primarily "to preserve the
normal citizen from breach of society's criminal laws .

.

. Inas-

much as the criminal is involved in this process, he is no more
than an essential means to this end. He is the 'indispensable
sacrifice to the common good.' "126 Morton also characterizes this
"means," or "suitable object for the object-lesson," as a "scapegoat. "127
This willingness to sacrifice the individual for a conception of
general utility ("a clear surplus of value") even extends to the
punishment of the wives and children of offenders in exceptional
situations. H.L.A. Hart, in commenting upon the occasional historical resort to punishment of offenders' wives and children, states in
Punishment and Responsibility, published in 1968: "In extreme
cases many might still think it right to resort to these expedients
but we should do so with the sense of sacrificing an important
28
principle."1
The issue has more than historical interest. Under Hitler and
Stalin, members of families could be punished for certain crimes
committed by a family member. This willingness to sacrifice individual human rights in exceptional situations extends to the sacrifice of an innocent. H.L.A. Hart comments on the hypothetical
situation where a "negro might be sent to prison or executed on a
false charge of rape in order to avoid widespread lynching of many
others":
[B]ut a system which openly empowered authorities to do this
kind of thing, even if it succeeded in averting specific evils like
lynching, would awaken such apprehension and insecurity that
any gain from the exercise of these powers would by any utili-

125. J.D. MORTON, supra note 121, at 40-41.
126. Id. at 52 (quoting J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT).
127. Id. at 39, 40.
128. H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 12.
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tarian calculation be offset by the misery caused by their existence. But official resort to this kind of fraud on a particular
occasion in breach of the rules and subsequent indemnification of
the officials responsible might save many lives and so be thought
12 9
to yield a clear surplus of value.
By implication, then, this leading contemporary theorist finds
scapegoating an innocent justifiable in exceptional situations if the
process is shrouded in the fog of state authority. The core of this
utilitarian approach to punishment is to use the ordinary offender
as an "example," as a sacrifice to the "general good," and as a
"scapegoat" and "suitable object for demonstration purposes."
The
offender is objectified: He becomes a hostage to society's utilitarian
purpose in crime prevention. In utilitarian thought concerning
punishment, there are at least three forms of objectification and
scapegoatism. First, in extreme cases, a few utilitarian thinkers believe that an individual who is innocent--(e.g., a wife or child of an
offender, or a Black)-may be punished as a scapegoat. Second,
Bentham stresses that the "principle object" of punishment is the
general "example" so that the ordinary offender is punished not
because of considerations of legal justice, but to prevent crime by
others. Though presumably guilty, such an offender is nevertheless
a scapegoat because his punishment is determined not by his fault
but by the fault of others. His punishment is justified because of
their violation, actual or threatened. Third, an offender may also be
used as a scapegoat in another sense: for a special "example" if he
or she commits a type of crime where there is ordinarily neither
certainty nor celerity of punishment. Consider Bentham:
To enable the value of the punishment to outweigh that of
the profit of the offense, it must be increased, in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls short in point of certainty ....
Punishment must be further increased in point of magnitude, in
proportion as it falls short in point of proximity.130
Justice Holmes vividly defends an objectified status for the offender. To the objection that the offender is treated as a "thing and
the like"' 3 1 and that he is used "as a tool to increase the general
welfare at his own expense,' 32 Justice Holmes replies that this
129. Id. (emphasis added) (emphasis deleted).
130. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE UTILrrARJANS 170, 173-74 (emphasis deleted).

131. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 38.
132. Id. at 40.
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"course is perfectly proper; but even if it is wrong, our criminal
law follows it, and the theory of our criminal law must be shaped
accordingly." 133 Justice Holmes frankly acknowledges that "justice
to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on
134
the other side of the scales."
Morris Cohen responds forcefully to the objection to deterrence as a violation of legal justice: "Kant and others have urged
that it cannot be just to punish anyone except for a wrong actually
committed; and much less can it be just to punish Peter in order to
prevent Paul from attempting any crime."' 35 Using some of Justice
Holmes's examples, Cohen replies:
Why should we not inflict pain on A if that is the only way of
securing the safety of the society of which he is a part, or preserving the general conditions of desirable life on which he depends for all his goods? 361 We tax an old bachelor for the support of the education of other men's children and we conscript
our youth and put them in positions where they will be killed in
order that others shall be able to live. Consider the case of the
typhoid carrier Mary who spreads the germs of that dreadful disease wherever she goes. Do we not by detaining her and limiting her freedom in effect punish her for her misfortune rather
than for her fault? We are at all times inflicting pains on innocent people in order to promote the common good, in time of
peace, as well as in war .... We are all members of a common

body and the health of the entire body may137demand inflicting
pain or even the cutting off of some member.
Again we are reminded of Justice Holmes's words: "Public policy
sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the
burden of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put
an end to robbery and murder.'

138

133. Id. The shaping of criminal law theory to accord with practice is a conspicuous example of imperial theorizing: The function of theory is to justify practice,
not to provide a basis for judging it.
134. Id.
135. Cohen, Moral Aspects of Punishment, in THE CRI mINAL IN THE ARMS OF
THE LAW 27, 31 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
136. The assumption is that punishing the offender is "the only way" to secure
"the safety of society." From a status quo perspective, it is "the only way." Other
ways, rooted in a minimum anthropological, sociological, or social psychological
perspective could raise disquieting issues about core values and practices (e.g.,
glorification of aggressiveness, violence, and greed).
137. Cohen, Moral Aspects of Punishment, in THE CRIMINAL IN THE ARMS OF
THE LAw 27, 31-32 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
138.

O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 41.
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A critique of these varied utilitarian approaches to punishment
requires a basis for assessment.
Criteriaof a Justification of Punishment
Any analysis of the validity of traditional justifications of
punishment-retribution and general deterrence-presupposes the
resolution of an underlying issue: How do we judge a purported
justification as valid or invalid? Before we can judge particular justifications, we must first confront what we mean by a justification.
What should be its nature and scope? What standards do we use in
judging? H.L.A. Hart suggests an initial framework: Theories of
punishment are normative rather than empirical in character.
[T]heories of punishment are not theories in any normal sense.
They are not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions
as to what is or what is not the case; the atomic theory or the
kinetic theory of gases is a theory of this sort. On the contrary,
those major positions concerning punishment which are called
deterrent or retributive or reformative "theories" of punishment
are moral claims as to what justifies the practice of punishment-claims as to why, morally, it should or may be used. 139
Stated differently, theories of punishment are prescriptive, not
simply descriptive or explanatory or interpretive. Theories of punishment are moral claims dealing with a problem in society and history, not simply an abstract metaphysical or theological problem.
What are the specific criteria to determine the validity of such
a moral claim? Any justification of a policy and "practice of punishment" requires that there first be established the justice of a
penal code which provides the framework for punishment. This requires a particular ethical assessment (e.g., is the code validated by
humanistic master beliefs); a particular social and political assessment (e.g., does the code fairly distribute prohibitions in the community-is it a weapon of dominant ruling elites); a particular legal
assessment (e.g., is it procedurally fair); and the recognition of an
evolving historical and cultural context within which all this varied
assessment occurs.
Second, any justification of punishment requires that the role
assigned to the penal law system be addressed. This is the "how
much" question-for example, "how much" crime control is to be
sought as an ideal or objective and why.
Third, a particular penal law system and its role are not simply
139. H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 72 (emphasis deleted).
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formal policy and "law-in-the-books": They are also "law-in-action."
A justification of punishment must validate or invalidate punishment on the formal, institutional level and as it is actually practiced
by police, court, and prison personnel. This includes the imposition of punishment against individuals.
Lastly, a justification of the policy and "practice of punishment" must be an integral part of a more general theory of criminal
law. Such a theory should specify a basis for validating or invalidating the justice of substantive and procedural penal provisions, the
appropriateness of a response to the "how much" question, and the
fairness of "law-in-action." Resolution of these issues is essential to
justify punishment and to fulfill other functions of the criminal law,
such as its central role in the preservation of liberty and its role in
relation to economic and social rights. To fulfill these functions, a
theory of criminal law must be rooted in political-legal theory. Historically and currently, the criminal law has been an integral part of
the total 'web of institutions and practice through which communities function. It is artificial and distorting to separate a theory of
criminal law from theories justifying the total web of institutions
and practice. As Helen Silving notes, the "divergent criminal law
philosophies . . . are in the last analysis philosophies of govern-

ment."140 They should be explicitly linked to the more general
philosophies to which they are related (e.g., capitalist, Marxist, or
religious), and they should be judged by their conformity to or
their departure from humanistic master beliefs.
A Humanistic Critique
Humanists reject general deterrence in its central organizing
principles: its concept of the individual offender and its concept of
the relationship between the offender and the state. Offenders
should not be objectified as hostages to the state's political purpose;
14 1
they are not "an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety";
they are not a "tool to increase the general welfare at [their] own
expense";1 42 and they are not a "suitable object" for "demonstration purposes."143 All of this is classic imperial thought: the individual objectified as a means to achieve state purpose.

140.

Silving, A Plea for a New Philosophy of Criminal Justice, 35 REviSTA
401, 404 (1966).

JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico

141.

See note 121 supra and accompanying text.

142.
143.

See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
See note 125 supra and accompaniying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 831

Humanism offers precisely opposing organizing principles in
viewing the individual and in limiting the state's use of individuals
to increase "aggregate social welfare." In the words of John Rawls:
It has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be
supported by the convictions of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle between the claims of liberty and
right on the one hand and the desirability of increasing aggregate
social welfare on the other; and that we give a certain priority, if
not absolute weight, to the former. Each member of society is
thought to have an inviolability founded on justice, or, as some
say, a natural right, which even the welfare of everyone else
cannot override. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some
is made right by a greater good shared by others ....

Therefore

in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or
to the calculus of social interests.1 44
C.S. Lewis comments:
There is no sense in talking about a "just deterrent"

. . . .

We

demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it will
deter . ... Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal
deserves and consider only what will . . deter others, we have

tacitly removed from him the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object
145

There is an irreconcilable difference between the requirements of a
utilitarian-based prevention and the requirements of legal justice.
They are in fundamentally different realms of meaning, purpose,
and social organization. General prevention does not violate justice-it displaces justice.
Humanists reject all forms of objectification and scapegoatism.
Innocents should not be scapegoated, even in extreme cases, not
even to gain a clear surplus of value. 14 6 Offenders should not be
scapegoated because of the threat posed by others, whether actual
or potential. An offender should not be scapegoated because he or
she commits a type of crime where there is ordinarily neither "certainty nor celerity of punishment." Institutional ineffectiveness in
producing certainty and celerity should not be compensated for by
144.
145.

J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27-28 (1971).
Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THE CRIMINAL IN
THE ARMS OF THE LAw 43 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).

146. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 12.
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scapegoating the offender who is caught and convicted. Lastly, individuals should not be scapegoated as a way to remedy problems
that are rooted in systemic realities.
The specific analogies cited by Justice Holmes and Morris
Cohen to justify using deterrence of the individual for social benefit
present examples which are distinguishable. First, the example of
the conscripted soldier assumes that conscription is valid. Conscription for an aggressive war, aside from ethical considerations, is invalid because such wars are illegal since the Nuremberg Judgment
and the United Nations Charter. Conscription in a humanistic society for a defensive war should be unjustified and unnecessary because masses of citizens would volunteer to serve. Conscription
would be abolished as a classic weapon of the imperial state. Second, the example of the family whose home is being taken for a
road or bridge assumes that the road or bridge will serve a public
interest. Experience indicates that it may serve mostly the interest
of road or bridge builders and their political and union supporters.
If the road or bridge is justified, the family whose home is being
taken is being used. That must be acknowledged. But the family is
not used as a scapegoat and liberty is not at stake. The payment of
compensation, though it may be insufficient for what is lost in family roots and meaning, expresses the completely different use of the
family. The compensation is an effort to minimize or eliminate any
economic loss. The family may nevertheless be hurt, but it is not
being scapegoated or even punished for a wrong. Third, Typhoid
Mary is being used for a general good, but she, too, is certainly not
being scapegoated or punished for a wrong. She is not the subject
of condemnation. Indeed, the Constitution forbids punishment for
a status (e.g., being a drug addict).' 4 7 In addition, there may be
medical alternatives to confinement.
The state's use of offenders as scapegoats differs markedly from
the state's subordination of individual interests to the claimed
common interest in other situations. It is one thing to argue that
individual interests may be fairly subordinated to a legitimate general interest. It is another thing to argue that an individual offender
may be used as a scapegoat to achieve such an interest. The traditional formulation of this issue-whether or not a person may be
treated merely as a means or must be treated as an end also-is
rejected as too gross. This formulation masks the sharply different
ways in which individual interests may be sacrificed to claimed
147.

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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common interests and the political and ethical validity of these diverse interests and sacrifices.
Humanists reject general deterrence on both institutional and
individual levels. On the institutional level, humanists reject general deterrence as the correct "primary and essential postulate" of
the criminal law system, as the correct "General Justifying Aim of
the practice of punishment,"' 148 and as deserving a "central position
in the philosophy of criminal law."' 149 General deterrence provides
no autonomous purpose or justification for the institutional criminal
law process. Any general preventive empirical effect emerging from
the operations of a criminal law system, including any "moral and
social-pedagogical influence,"' 150 is ancillary and is not a justification. Society must explore other paths to cope with its crime problems. The pursuit of the "aggregate social good" must not sacrifice
the "rights secured by justice" to "political bargaining or to the
calculus of social interests."
On the individual level, general deterrence provides no autonomous purpose or justification for sentencing the offender. An offender has a right to legal fairness, including a right to be free from
use as a scapegoat for the achievement of a general social purpose.
This principle should be embodied in practice. Each person has
the right to be free from punishment except for wrongs he or she
has committed. Violation does not make a person fair prey to suffer
for the wrongs which others have committed, are committing, or
might commit. The individual should not be available for such use.
No punishment should be based or extended on general deterrence considerations because that would ignore or displace considerations of justice. As Henry M. Hart states: "[The] very ideal of
justice is offended by seriously unequal penalties for substantially
similar crimes . . . . "15 Yet general deterrence inevitably causes
unequal punishment because of the shifting political needs of the
state for crime control. The use of the offender to meet these shifting needs adds a sharp political dimension to punishment.
This highly politicized sentencing is incompatible with one of
the most basic principles of criminal law jurisprudence: Each person is responsible for what he or she does; guilt is personal.
Punishment should not be collectively determined. This politicized
148.
149.
150.
151.

See generally text accompanying notes 58-93 supra.
See generally id.
See text accompanying note 9 supra.
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 439

(1958).
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sentencing is also lawless. As Andenaes states, although the sentence imposed is within the specified sentencing framework for a
particular crime (usually providing substantial discretion), "such
sentences are not, in fact, applications of previously established
norms. The judge establishes a norm to suit the situation."' 152 As
Andenaes points out, this ad hoe approach exists whenever a sentence is imposed on a deterrence rationale.' 5 3 This form of ad hoc
politicized sentencing seems to reflect traditional political-legal
theory according to which rights flow from our membership in the
political society; this justification is a social contract approach.
When we commit a crime, we place ourselves outside the society.
We are metamorphosed from our position as persons with many
15 4
rights to what Kant described as a "condition" of penal "slavery"'
or, in traditional legal language, to a condition of being "a slave of
the state"'15 5 with no legal rights. This political-legal approach has
changed with the rejection of the slave of the state doctrine and
with the recognition that offenders have a range of constitutional
rights, whether on parole, on probation, or in prison.' 5 6 It is time
to effectuate the principle that both guilt and punishment are personal and to forbid this lawless and highly politicized sentencing.
Our constitutional imperatives of equal protection and due process,
and our prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, should
bar this sacrifice of the individual by means of the violation of basic
principles of criminal law jurisprudence.
Finally, general deterrence is not a justification of punishment
from a humanistic standpoint. When viewed narrowly, general deterrence thinking presupposes or ignores the validity of the underlying substantive penal code; the fairness of the procedural code;
the role of enforcement of both codes in fostering selective societal
interests; and the response to the question of "how much" social
control is to be sought by punishment. For a valid justification, all
of these issues must be addressed. When viewed more broadly
within a utilitarian framework, general deterrence thinking can
provide a basis for addressing these issues. That basis, however, is
152. Andenaes, supra note 7, at 983.
153. Id. at 982.
154. See Kant, Justice and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT 102, 104-06 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
155. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
156. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole); Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (probation); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.
1944) (prison), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
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a conception of utility exemplified in "dominant master beliefs and
social structures" in a "particular historical, ideological, and material context." The validity of this conception is assumed, not addressed, and it usually serves the interests of dominant elites.
General deterrence thinking, based on a conception of utility, is,
therefore, an "engine" of "justification." It can easily justify substantive and procedural penal codes, the use of both codes in serving dominant elites, and a response to the "how much" question.
Indeed, these codes and practices themselves exemplify dominant
master beliefs and related interests. General deterrence thinking
can provide a basis for invalidating practice which is inconsistent
with the dominant beliefs, but it cannot invalidate these beliefs
because they have an a priori status: They are assumed to be valid.
General deterrence, even when viewed within an utilitarian framework, therefore, is a rationalization of status quo practice and is
not a justification of punishment from a humanistic point of view.
It provides a defective basis for assessing and judging a theory and
practice of punishment.
PART IV
RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT

The major expositions of retribution in modem philosophy are
made by Kant and Hegel. Both theories are presented and
critiqued from a humanistic perspective. In addition, popular forms
of retribution are briefly assessed.
Kant's Retribution
Kant, one of the most influential of modem philosophers,
urges a distinctive and provocative form of retribution.
Punishment is the right of the "supreme power" of the state
"to inflict pain on a subject in consequence of his having committed a crime." 157 This supreme power (or suzerain) himself cannot
be punished. 158 The grounds for punishment of subjects is in what
the subject deserves for committing a crime, not in utility, either
for the offender or for others. 159 A person "can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else."' 6 0 A
157. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99 (J. Ladd trans.
1965).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 100.
160. Id.
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person's "innate personality" prohibits using him in a quest in the
"winding paths of a theory of happiness." In contrast, "punishment
is a categorical imperative [for] [i]f legal justice perishes, then it is
161
no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth."'
The decisive principle and standard of legal justice is "equality":
the "principle of not treating one side more favorably than the
other."'1 2 In Kant's words: "[A]ny undeserved evil that you inflict
on someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself.
If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you
steal from yourself, if you kill him, you kill yourself. " 163 Kant's
meaning is that a theft "makes the ownership of everyone else insecure," and hence the thief "robs himself. . . of the security of
any possible ownership."' 1 64 By implication, the same result occurs
in instances of assault, murder, and other crimes. Kant concludes
that, "[o]nly the Law of retribution (jus taliones) [administered by a
court] can determine exactly the kind and degree of punish65
ment."1
Kant's approach to punishment is expressed vividly in his famous example of the island society which has decided to dissolve
itself, with the people dispersing to other places: "[T]he last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone
will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to
insist on carrying out the punishment .....166
Kant's retributive theory of punishment is an integral part of
his political and legal philosophy. Professor John Ladd, a philosophical interpreter and translator of Kant, describes Kant as "the
philosophical defender par excellence of the rights of man, of his
16 8
equality, 11671 and of a republican form of government."'
Strong arguments can be mustered, as Ladd does, for this
characterization. The dignity of the individual is a central element
in Kant's thinking, giving the person an intrinsic worth that is

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 101.

166.

Id. at 102.

167. Kant's notion of equality has sweeping exceptions: apprentices, servants,
minors, women, private tutors, sharecroppers, and children born out of wedlock-all
of those who "must he under the orders of protection of other individuals." Id. at 79.
168. Ladd, Introduction to id. at ix.
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"'above all price and admits of no equivalent.' "169 From this
worth flows Kant's principle of the equality of man, the innate right
to freedom, and hence, legal and political rights. Morality and law
are founded on individual rights, not social utility; violation of the
rights of men, therefore, cannot be justified on the basis of "the
good of mankind." The end does not justify the means. 170 An opponent of slavery, war and violence, and revolution, Kant believed
that freedom and peace are requirements of justice.
Kant's statement that "any undeserved evil that you inflict on
someone else .. .is one that you do to yourself"'1 71 seems to be a

reflection of his idea that each person gives the moral law to
himself-that each of us is a sovereign legislator in the moral
realm. This statement also seems to express Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law."172 This,
according to Kant, means practically that one should, "[aict so that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only."' 173 Theft,
robbery, assault, and murder treat the victim as a means, disregarding the victim's dignity and worth, and violate the victim's
legal rights to negative freedom and peace (i.e., to be free from
such intrusions). The evil done to the perpetrator when he victimizes another person arises from violation of the categorical imperative: "[Ihf you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you
kill him, you kill yourself."' 174 Given the centrality of these principles in Kant's social philosophy, his emphasis upon "punishment"
as a "categorical imperative"'175 seems more understandable. Juridical punishment is the realization of these ethical and political prin176
ciples; the evil done to another is paid back to the perpetrator.
The failure of legal justice imposes a "blood-guilt"-in the case of
169. Id. (quoting I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 53
(L. Beck trans. 1959)).
170. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (L. Beck
trans. 1959).
171. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (J. Ladd trans.
1965).
172.

Ladd, Introduction to id. at x (quoting I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE

METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L. Beck trans. 1959)).
173.

Id. (quoting I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47

(L. Beck
174.
1965).
175.
176.

trans. 1959)).
I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (J. Ladd trans.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 100-01.
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murder-upon all those who are responsible for the failure.1 77 And
the rejection of utilitarian justifications of punishment manifests
Kant's general rejection of utilitarian justifications of law and
morality.
Kant's retributive theory of punishment is centrally related to
a paradoxical dimension of his political principles: his role as a
philosophical defender of the politically powerful. In Kant's words,
"there is no right of sedition . . . much less a right of revolution
... . It is the people's duty to endure even the most intolerable
abuse of supreme authority. The reason . . . is that resistance to
the supreme legislation can itself only be unlawful . . .as destroying the entire lawful constitution .... "178
While there is no right of revolution' 7 -indeed it is charac8 - terized as a "crime of the people"'
if a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been
established, the illegitimacy of its beginning and of its success
cannot free the subjects from being bound to accept the new
order of things as good citizens, and they cannot refuse to honor
and obey the suzerain.. . who now possesses the authority.' 8 '
Kant is relentless in insisting on the command, "[o]bey the suzerain who has authority over you," even asserting that "it is in itself
18 2
punishable to inquire publically into the title of his acquisition."'
When challenged by a friendly critic for failing to distinguish between the "Idea of sovereignty" and a person who has "imposed
himself upon me as a lord,"' 1 3 including the prohibition of inquiring into "who has given him the right to issue commands to
85
me,"' 8 4 Kant reaffirmed his position.1
Professor Ladd provides insight into the Kantian reasoning:
Every actual state represents to a greater or lesser degree of
perfection the Idea [ideal] of the state; in Plato's terms, it "par-

177. See generally id. at 102.

178. Id. at 86.
179. Id. at 88. Nevertheless, Kant was a fervent supporter of the French Revolution, and particularly of the ideals embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of

Man.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 89.
at 140.
at 139.
at 130.
at 138.
at 138-41.
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ticipates in"or "imitates" the Idea of the state, the archetype....
All our political and legal obligations have their source in the
Idea, and so we are obligated to obey the political authorities in
actual states because, however imperfectly, they still represent
the Idea.' s6
Kant's defense of the politically powerful rests on what he sees as
the alternative: a Hobbesian state of nature involving war and violence or a constant threat of war and violence.' 8 7 In constituting
themselves a state, a people have "completely abandoned [their]
wild, lawless freedom [in the state of nature] in order to find
[their] whole freedom again undiminished in a lawful dependency,
.. . in a juridical state of society."' 8 8 The state of nature is repugnant to Kant's principle of the innate right to liberty and, hence,
all have the duty to leave the state of nature and join a juridical
89

society. 1

Kant's retributive theory of punishment is rooted in the belief,
as Ladd expresses it, that "[a]ny act of violence or lawlessness . ..
represents a return to the state of nature and is to be deprecated as
a crime of injustice."' 90 Crime provides both a sufficient and
necessary condition of punishment. Crime is illegitimate coercion,
and punishment is legitimate coercion. Legitimate coercion is "consistent with the freedom of everyone in accordance with universal

laws."'ig Within this framework, Kant's emphasis that "[t]he law
concerning punishment is a categorical imperative"'192 is a logical
expression of these principles; so is his insistence that "[i]f legal
justice perishes, then it is no longer worth while for men to remain alive on this earth [and thus they will return to the state of
nature]."' 193 His insistence on executing "the last murderer remain-

ing in prison" in the dispersing island society may also be interpreted as upholding the "Idea" of the "juridical state of society."
Key elements in Kant's retributive theory of punishment
(right-hand column) rest upon, inter alia, key elements in his polit186. Ladd, Introduction to id. at xxx-xxxi.
187. Id. at xx.
188. I. KANT, Ti METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

OF JUSTICE

81 (J. Ladd trans,

1965).
189. Ladd, Introduction to id. at xx.
190. Id. at xxi.
191. Id.
192. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans,

1965).
193. Id.
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ical theory (left-hand column):
A.

Law and morality are based on a
priori general principles of justice,
not on utility.

Punishment is based on principles of
194
legal justice, not on utility.

B.

A Hobbesian view of natural hu19
man behavior (wvild and violent).

C.

A Hobbesian view of social life in
the "state of nature" with war and
violence or threat thereof (where,
for example, "killing another can
never be called murder").

"[I]f legal justice perishes, then it is no
longer worth while for men to remain
alive on this earth." 98
"[I]f legal justice perishes, then it
is no
longer worth while for men to remain
alive on this earth."

D.

Organized political society-the
state-offers the only escape from
dismal life in a state of nature.

Crime represents a return to the
abhorrent "state of nature" and creates
a sufficient and necessary condition for
punishment to prevent this return.

E.

The state is the realizer of rights,
the vindicator of wrongs, and the
guarantor of peace and freedom.

Punishment is a categorical imperative
for the state. 197 Failure to impose
punishment imposes a "bloodguilt" (in
the case of murder).198

F.

"Act only according to that maxim
by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law."' 99

"[Alny undeserved evil that you inflict
on someone else ... is one that you do
to yourself. . . . Only the Law of retribution (]us taliones) can determine
exactly the kind and degree of punish200
ment."

G.

The laws are identified with justice. 20 '

Criminal law, legal justice, and desert
are identified with justice.
(continued on page 894)

194. Kant, Philosophy of Law, in GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 257 (C. Morris
ed. 1959).
195. Ladd, Introduction to I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE at xx (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
196. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans.
1965).
197. Kant, Philosophy of Law, in GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 257 (C. Morris
ed. 1959).
198. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (J. Ladd trans.
1965).
199. Ladd, Introduction to id. at x (quoting I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L. Beck trans. 1959)).
200. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (J. Ladd trans.
1965).
201. Id. at 33.
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(continuedfrom page 893)

H.

There is a focus on the violence
and lawlessness of subjects.

Punishment provides a means for
domination by the "supreme power";
only subjects may 20be punished, not the
"supreme power."

2

A Critique of Kant's Retribution
Kant's retributive theory of punishment is an integral part of
his political philosophy-his world view and its requisite presuppositions. 20 3 One is reminded of Helen Silving's characterization
of "divergent criminal law philosophies . . . which are in the last

analysis philosophies of government," 20 4 or at least partial phih)sophies of government. Kant's punishment theory rests, in
sdbstantial part, on his theory of human nature and behavior
("natural violence"); 20 5 on his theory of social life in a "state of
nature" ("[mien . . . can never be safe against violence from each

other"); 20 6 on his theory of a powerful state (a "supreme power") as
the realizer of individual rights and the creator and guarantor of
peace and freedom; and on his theory of law which identifies it
with "justice." Reject these presuppositions and the core idea of
punishment as a "categorical imperative" topples. If one rejects
Hobbesian notions of natural human behavior in a state of nature
(say on philosophical, historical, and anthropological grounds), the
idea of crime as a threat of a return to a state of nature makes no
sense. If one views the state not as the realizer of individual rights
and as the creator and guarantor of peace and freedom, but as their
principal violator, historically and currently, by way of war, slaughter, genocide, and other oppression, the one-sidedness of Kant's
punishment theory-exempting the "supreme power" and concentrating on the crimes of subjects-is a travesty. The state does not
represent the "holiest right and justice": 20 7 It is frequently a Leviathan whose officials are instrumental in the worst horrors.

202. Id. at 90.
203. For another view of Kant's political and legal philosophy, see W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY

204.

205.

157-61 (5th ed. 1967).

Silving, supra note 140, at 404.
Kant, Philosophy of Law, in GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 253 (C. Morris

ed. 1959).
206. Id.

207. I.

KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE

88 n.8 (J. Ladd ed.

1965).
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To postulate desert and jus taliones as principles of punishment, while restricting punishment to subjects, exposes a core
function of these principles in an ideology and apparatus of state
domination. Outside of the state framework, even "killing another
. .can never be called murder [in the state of nature],"' 208 and the
existence as -well as the destruction of an out of wedlock child can
be ignored. The reason: The "child has crept surreptitiously into
20 9
If
the commonwealth" and is "outside the protection of law."
one sees law partly as a traditional institutional means in colonialism, militarism, racism, and classism, then criminal law, legal
justice, and desert are not automatically identified with the archetype of, or even an imperfect representation of, the idea of
Justice-either in practice or in theory. Even Kant's antiutilitarian stance seems like a mask, which obscures his instrumental
view of punishment as a counter to the threat posed by crime of a
return to the state of nature. Despite Kant's statement that
punishment is a good in itself, he does not advocate punishment
simply for its own sake or simply for "justice," but to preserve the
"juridical society." Moreover, Kant's emphasis on equality provides
a dismal basis for thinking about punishment because of his sweeping exceptions. Lastly, despite Kant's emphasis on equality, crime
is viewed as simply individual in character. This reductionist view
of crime leads inevitably to a similar view of punishment: Convicted offenders bear the entire responsibility for crime, a scapegoatist punishment. With the rejection of these core principles
in Kant's approach, his punishment theory collapses as one-sided,
state-centered, reductionist, and scapegoatist.
Kant's punishment theory is an expression of the paradox of
his political and legal analysis: The "philosophical defender par excellence of the rights of man, of man's equality, and of a republican
form of government, '210 is at the same time a proponent of a
"marked authoritarianism"; the fervent supporter of the French
Revolution is an unremitting foe of revolution, this "crime of the
people"; the apostle of equality is an advocate of inequality. Kant's
towering stature in modern philosophy should not rest on this
political and legal analysis. Clearly, Kant's philosophy provides insight for our era, but no philosophy rooted in the past can provide
sufficient guidance for the unfolding present.
*

Id. at 106.
209. Id.
210. Ladd, Introduction to id. at ix.
208.
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Hegel's Retribution
Like Kant, Hegel has a distinctive and influential theory of
retributive punishment. Hegel believes that crime is the coercive
infringement of "right." 21 ' Considerations of deterrence and reformation presuppose the fact that punishment "is inherently and actually just."2 12 For Hegel, the "only important things are, first,
that crime is to be annulled, not because it is the producing of an
evil, but because it is an infringement of the right as right, and
secondly, the question of what that positive existence is which
crime possesses and which must be annulled." 2 13 Hegel explains
that "[t]he sole positive existence which the injury possesses is that
it is the particular will of the criminal." 2 14 Hence, to penalize "this
particular will . . . is to annul the crime, which otherwise would
2 15
have been held valid, and to restore the right."
A crime is "the action of a rational being and this implies that
it is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid
down a law which he has explicitly recognized in his action and
under which in consequence he should be brought as under his
right."2 16 Punishment is "a right established within the criminal
himself, i.e., in his objectively embodied will, in his action," and
thus "by being punished he is honoured as a rational being," not
211. Hegel's full definition of crime and the criminal law is:
The initial act of coercion as an exercise of force by the free agent, an
exercise of force which infringes the existence of freedom in its concrete
sense, infringes the right as right, is crime-a negatively infinite judgment in
its full sense, whereby not only the particular (i.e. the subsumption under
my will of a single thing ... ) is negated, but also the universality and infinity in the predicate 'mine' (i.e. my capacity for rights). Here the negation
does not come about with the co-operation of my thinking (as it does in
fraud...) but in defiance of it. This is the sphere of criminal law.
G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 67-68 (T. Knox trans. 1942) (footnotes omitted).
Friedmann summarizes Hegel's conception of crime and punishment as follows:
[I]n so far as the individual is a being of impulses, private interests, etc., he
may oppose himself to the universal will. This results in a wrong, of which
the greatest is crime. By committing a crime, the individual openly negates
the right, and right must restore itself by negating the negation. This is done
by punishment, the object of which is to restore the true will of the criminal,
that is the will which is in accordance with the universal. Hegel therefore
rejects the deterrent theory of punishment. The object of punishment is to
restore right.
W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 167 (5th ed. 1967).
212. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70 (T. Knox trans. 1942).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 70.
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treated "as a harmful animal who has to be made harmless, or with
2 17
a view to deterring and reforming him."
Since Hegel defines both crime and punishment in light of his
concept of right, his definition of right is vital: "In speaking of
Right . . . we mean not merely what is generally understood by
the word, namely civil law, but also morality, ethical life, and
world-history; these belong just as much to our topic, because the
concept brings thoughts together into a true system." 2 18 Hegel is
clear that not all coercion is a violation of right. He "justifies
civilized nations in regarding and treating as barbarians those who
lag behind them in institutions which are the essential moments of
the state." 219 Hegel is quite specific in this justification of imperialism: "Thus a pastoral people may treat hunters as barbarians,
and both of these are barbarians from the point of view of agriculturists . . . . The civilized nation is conscious that the rights of
barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only
a formality.
... 2 Imperialism by "civilized nations" in no "coercive infringement of a right" and hence no crime. It seems only a
corollary that all those anywhere who resist this coercion may he
repressed as without right.
In Hegel's scheme, state aggrandizement is not limited to imperialism against hunters, pastoral people, and agriculturists. One
state can acquire "absolute rights" against other states:
The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the
form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of the self-developing self-consciousness
of the world mind. This nation is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once . . .that it can make its
hour strike. In contrast with this its absolute right of being the
vehicle of this present stage in the world mind's development,
the minds of the other nations are without rights, and they,
along with those whose hour has struck already, count no longer
221
in world history ....
The exercise of "absolute right" against the nations "without rights"
is no infringement of right and hence no crime. A fortiori, those
people anywhere who oppose this exercise of "absolute right" have
no right and may be repressed. Hegel is clear that "coercion" by
217. Id.
218.

Id. at 233.

219. Id. at 219.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
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"heroes" who found states and make history "is a rightful coercion." 222 Hegel's emphasis on war as a way of strengthening the
state, quieting domestic strife, and preventing stagnation and corruption legitimizes war as an instrument of the state and of heroes
'
who incorporate the "world mind. "223
Hegel's theory of retributive punishment is derived from his
theories of history and ethics. To understand these theories, it is
essential to understand Hegel's political theory, his concept of the
state. A brief sketch of these theories is therefore appropriate;
however, no effort is made here to present or criticize Hegel's
general philosophy. The sketch of Hegel's theories of history,
ethics, and politics is presented with an awareness that his writings
are paradoxical and extraordinarily challenging and that Hegel may
have intended something different from what his writings appear to
say. The interpretation presented here is not novel; it relies essen224
tially on Ernst Cassirer's analysis in his The Myth of the State.
Whatever may have been Hegel's intent, his writings have had
specific consequences for political and legal thought. Hegel was
multifaceted: an incredible philosophical genius; an admirer of
Napoleon in his days of triumph ("I saw the emperor, this soul of
2 25 All of
the world"); and "the philosopher of the Prussian State."
these realities have influenced his writings.
In Ernst Cassirer's description of Hegel's theory of history,
"God not only 'has' history, he is history";2 2 6 "history is the development of Spirit in Time . . "227 In Hegel's words:
It was for a while the fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God, as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it be allowed that Providence manifests itself in
such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal
History? This is deemed too great a matter to be thus regarded.
But divine wisdom, i.e. Reason, is one and the same in the great
as in the little; and we must not imagine God to be too weak to
exercise his wisdom on the grand scale ....
Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a Theodicaea-a justification of
the ways of God .... 228
222. Id. at 45.
223. Id. at 210, 217, 295-96.
224. E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946).
225. Id. at 272.
226. Id. at 262.
227. Id. at 255.

228. Id. (quoting G. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 16

(J. Sibree trans. London 1857)).
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Hegel concludes: "[W]e are thus concerned exclusively with the
Idea of Spirit and in the History of the World regard everything as
only its manifestation .....229
Hegel, however, does not, in Cassirer's words, "seek the 'Idea'
in a supercelestial space.... [Rather,] [h]e finds it in the actuality
of man's social life and of his political struggles."2 30 Hegel emphasizes that "[w]hat is rational [the Idea] is actual and what is
actual is rational. . . . [Nlothing is actual except the Idea. ... "231
"[T]he great thing," Hegel says, "is to apprehend in the show of
232
the temporal and transient . . . the eternal which is present."

Hege's Philosophy of Right is "the science of the state" and is
233
antithetical to any effort to "construct a state as it ought to be."The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea . ... "234 The individual, as a member of the state, acquires "objectivity, genuine
individuality, and an ethical life." 23 5 Hegel's ethical imperative for

individuals follows inexorably: "[I]n an ethical community [i.e., in a
state], it is easy to say what a man must do ....

[H]e has simply to

23 6
follow the well-known and explicit rules of his own situation.Hegel's conception of history and of ethics leads to his conception of the state. The state is the "incarnation of the 'spirit of the
world,' . . . the 'Divine Idea as it exists on earth.' "237 "[M]ajesty
and absolute authority" are characteristics of "the absolutely divine

229. Id. at 261 (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 82 (T. Knox trans.

1942)).
230. Id.
231.

G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis deleted).

Hegel, however, does not equate all empirical reality with the rational:
We must presuppose intelligence enough to know . . .that existence is in

part mere appearance, and only in part reality. In common life, any freak of
fancy, any error, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every
degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way the name
of reality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to forbid a fortuitous
existence getting the name of a real; for by fortuitous we mean an existence
which has no greater value than that of something possible which may as
well not be as be. As for the term reality, these critics would have done well
to consider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed logic I had treated
amongst other things of reality, and accurately distinguished it not only from
the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence; but even from the cognate
categories of existence and other modifications of being.
E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 261-62 (quoting G. HEGEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES, § 6).
232. G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 10.
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id. at 155.
235. Id. at 156.
236. Id. at 107 (emphasis deleted).
237. E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 263.
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principle of the state." 2 38 In the state, then, in Cassirer's words,
there is "the supreme and most perfect reality," 239 an unprecedented political theory. The state "has supreme right against the
240
individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state."
The origin of the state is not the social contract; its end is not the
protection of "personal freedom" and "property." 24 1 Neither heroes
who found states and make history nor the state itself is bound by
' 2 42
moral limitation; "heroic coercion is a rightful coercion."
A Critique of Hegel's Retribution
The contrast below portrays the antithetical nature of the
Hegelian theories sketched above and of humanistic ideas previously presented.
Hegel
1.

The individual, as a member of the
state, acquires "objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical
life." 243

Humanism
Individuals realize their individuality in
an ethical life by fulfilling their potentialities within the context of supportive
institutions and culture.

238. G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 157. Paradoxically, the "absolute authority"
has some limitation. In Cassirer's words:
There is, however, one point in which the difference between Hegel's
doctrine and modem theories of the totalitarian state becomes obvious.
While it is true that Hegel exempted the state from all moral obligations and
declared that the rules of morality lose their pretended universality when
we proceed from the problems of private life and private conduct to the
conduct of states, still there remain other bonds from which the state could
not be released. In the Hegelian system the state belongs to the sphere of
the "objective mind." But this sphere is only one element or moment in the
self-actualization of the Idea. In the dialectic process it is transcended by
that other sphere which, in Hegel's language, is called the realm of the "Absolute Idea." The Idea develops itself in three moments: Art, Religion, and
Philosophy. It is clear that the state cannot treat these highest cultural goods
as mere means for its own purposes. They are ends in themselves that have
to be respected and furthered. It is true that they have no separate existence
outside the state, for man cannot develop them without having organized his
social life. Nevertheless these forms of cultural life have an independent
meaning and value. They cannot be brought under a foreign jurisdiction.
The state remains, as Hegel says, "on the territory of finitude." Hegel could
not subordinate art, religion, and philosophy to it.
E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 274 (footnote omitted). Cassirer also emphasizes that
Hegel "would have rejected and abhorred the modem conceptions of the 'totalitarian' state." Id. at 275.
239.

E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 263.

240.
241.
242.
243.

G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 156.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 156.
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Hegel (continued)

Humanism (continued)

2.

The state is the "incarnation of the
'spirit of the world,' . . . the 'Divine Idea as it exists on earth.' "244

Society (culture and institutions) is
viewed as a humanly-created social reality, a result of political, social, and
ethical choices.

3.

The state with its majesty and absolute authority "has supreme right
against the individual, whose supreme duty
is to be a member of
245
the state."

The state acquires authority insofar as
it serves humanistic values. Individual
duties to the state are superseded by
the obligation to live in accordance
with humanistic norms.

4.

"The state is the actuality of the
246
ethical Idea ....

The state should be judged from the
perspective of independent normative
criteria.

5.

"[T]ruth.

6.

"What is rational [the Ideal is actual and what is actual is rational

. .

lies in power

....

247

"248

7.

"[P]hilosophy is the exploration of
the rational, . . . the present and
the actual, not the erection of a
beyond, supposed to exist, God
249
knows where ....

That which is true is not necessarily
politically powerful; that which is politically powerful is not necessarily true.
Human beings have the responsibility
to create reality by actualizing humanistic norms.
Philosophy should provide a basis for a
critique of present structures and related justifications; it should be a critical philosophy concerned with what
ought to be.

Cassirer states that "[aIll the German liberals . . . saw in the
Hegelian system the firmest stronghold of political reaction ...
2 50
Hegel was the most dangerous enemy of all democratic ideals."
Rudolf Haym wrote:
[A]1l that Hobbes or Filmer, Haller or Stahl have taught, is relatively open-minded in comparison with the famous phrase regarding the rationality of the real in the sense of Hegel's Preface
[to his Philosophy of Right]. The theory of divine free grace and
the theory of absolute obedience are blameless and innocuous in
comparison with the frightful doctrine which canonizes the sub25
sisting as such.

1

244. E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 263.
245. G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 156.
246. Id. at 155.
247. E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 267.
248. G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis deleted).
249. Id.
250. E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 250-51.
251. Id. at 251 (footnote omitted) (quoting R. HAYhf, HEGEL UND SEINE ZErr
367 (Berlin 1857)).
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To view the state as the "Divine Idea as it exists on earth" is a
startling political theory, a form of state worship-what Cassirer
calls "an entirely new type of absolutism."2 52 Hegel develops this
to a frightening extreme.2 53 This conception of the evolution of the
world has no limitation in morality. That is for the individual will,
not for the "Divine Idea" as it actualizes itself in the state. Nor is
this state worship limited by a notion of truth: "truth . . . lies in
power."2 54 These latter words prompt the usually restrained Cassirer to say that they "contain the clearest and most ruthless program of fascism that has ever been propounded by any political or
2 55
philosophic writer."
Hegel's "Theodicaea-a justification of the ways of God" presupposes a God whose "ways" include war, imperialism, and
other forms of state domination clothed in the name of right.2 50
Religious humanists postulate a God without such savage ways who
is manifested not in the state but in the strivings of many for a
personal and social life in accordance with humanistic norms.2 57
Indeed, viewing the central role of the state in the horror of history, it may be that the state is the diabolic idea as it exists on
earth.
Hegel's theory of retributive punishment is valid only if Hegelian presuppositions are accepted. These presuppositions include the Hegelian ideas of right and power; the idea of the state,
the idea of the individual, and the relationship between them; the
notion that crime is an assertion of the "particular will" against the
universal will; and the notion that the sole positive existence which
the injury possesses is that it is the particular will of the criminal.
Reject these presuppositions, however, or even a number of them,
and Hegel's retributive theory falls. Hegel's emphasis on penalizing
"this particular will" to "annul the crime" presupposes the prior
beliefs. So does his emphasis on punishment as a "right" of the
criminal and his conception of punishment as "inherently and actually just."258 Humanists postulate a different conception of right,
power, the individual, and the social order and therefore a dif252. Id. at 263.
253. See, e.g., G. HEGEL, supra note 211, at 217-18.
254. E. CASSIRER, supra note 224, at 267.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 255.
257. See, e.g., H. KiNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN (E. Quinn trans. 1976).
258. Despite this language, the Hegelian retributive theory seems quite utilitarian within the Hegelian world view: It is punishment for justice as defined in the

context of Hegel's conception of right, history, the state, and ethics.
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ferent conception of crime and punishment. Clearly, humanistic
thought is also incompatible with the reductionism and scapegoatism which is inherent in regarding the phenomenon of crime and
the responsibility for it solely on an individual level. Nevertheless, twentieth century humanists can value Hegel's insistence
that "punishment" must first be "inherently and actually just" and
his emphasis on right, though the meaning of justice and right is
quite different from a human rights point of view.
A Contemporary View of Retribution
A forceful presentation of contemporary retribution is offered
by Herbert Morris, an influential advocate:
Let us suppose that men are constituted roughly as they
now are, with a rough equivalence in strength and abilities, a
capacity to be injured by each other . . . a limited strength of
will, and a capacity to reason and to conform conduct to rules.
...[T]he core rules of our criminal law ... [provide] benefits for
all persons ....
[T]he rules establish a mutuality of benefit and
burden ....
.. . [F]airness dictates that a system in which benefits and
burdens are equally distributed have a mechanism designed to
prevent a maldistribution in the benefits and burdens....
...[I]t is just to punish those who have violated the rules
and caused the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens ...
Justice-that is punishing such individuals-restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what
he owes, that is, exacting the debt. 259
Humanists deny that the rules of criminal law establish a
mutuality of benefit and burden. Morris describes the "core rules"
as "rules that prohibit violence and deception and compliance with
that which provides benefits for all persons. These benefits consist
in noninterference by others with what each person values, such
matters as continuance of life and bodily security." 2 60 To understand why this is incorrect, it is necessary to note, first, that the
criminal law protects the grossly unequal distribution of general
benefits and burdens inherent in most existing political, economic,
and social structures, whether in Western, Marxist, or Third World
societies. Benefits and burdens are distributed in these societies
259. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in
(S. Grupp ed. 1971).
260.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

76, 78-79

Id. at 78.
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according to class, race, sex, ethnicity, party, and other criteria,
and the criminal law does not prohibit these stratifications. In fact,
criminal law strengthens and legitimizes the structures which pro26 1
duce such gross inequality in general benefits and burdens.
In addition, political, economic, and social structures powerfully affect that "maldistribution of benefit and burden" concerning
the "continuance of life and bodily security."2 6 2 Those political
leaders in charge of the war system are incomparably the greatest
violators of life and security. Young men have borne an especially
heavy burden in these nightmares. Our economic system produces
a class stratification which has a decisive effect on the day-to-day
risk of being murdered, assaulted, raped, or robbed (a much higher
risk in ghettos than in affluent neighborhoods). Indeed, class and
racial stratification profoundly influence the chance of being born
alive, of surviving infancy, of obtaining decent medical care, and of
acquiring sufficient quality education necessary to have the money
to live in low-risk communities. 263 The criminal law is an accomplice in the "maldistribution of benefit and burden" in the area
of the "continuance of life and bodily security." The criminal law
obscures and mystifies the actual inequality of benefits and burdens
with an egalitarian pretense and then reinforces this status quo
magic by pretending that punishment "restores [an] equilibrium"
264
that never existed.
This status quo magic describes justice as retributive punishment of those who have violated the rules and caused the unfair
distribution of benefits and burdens. Punishment erases the unfair
advantage gained by the violator. It "exact[s] the debt." 26 5 This
formulation transforms the entire burden of institutional and cultural injustice and inadequacy to individual violators. Societal re261. Illustrative examples of such support include: killings of soldiers in combat
are not murder; rape of wives by husbands, even if long separated, is not legally prohibited rape in most states; beatings of students by teachers is not assault; confinement
of thousands of our Japanese citizens during World War II is not kidnapping; violation
of the laws of war by civilian officials is not criminalized; depletion of irreplaceable
natural resources is not barred; and concentration of extreme wealth in the face of
extreme poverty is not condemned.
262. Morris, supra note 259, at 78-79.
263. See, e.g., S. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA
(1976); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972); S. LEVITAN, W. JOHNSON & R. TAGGART, STILL A
DREAiM: THE CHANGING STATUS OF BLACKS SINCE 1960 (1975); Sterne, Residents of

Harlem Suffer Worst Health in New York, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1978, at Al, col. 1.
264. Morris, supra note 259, at 79.
265. Id.
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sponsibility for the most fundamental problems is transformed into
purely individual responsibility. This is retributive scapegoatism
masquerading as justice. Crime is conceptualized only at the individual level; justice is conceptualized only as individual legal justice. These notions are inherent too in Kantian and Hegelian retribution and in the current popular forms.
Popular Forms of Retribution
Retribution is not, however, simply an abstract philosophical
issue. It is also a profound reality in the world of action. There was
a Nazi retribution and there are Soviet forms of retribution, Maoist
forms of retribution, Saudi Arabian forms of retribution, and American forms of retribution. It would be grossly inaccurate to explain
the wide range of retributive concepts and practices in the world
(some of them horrifying) in light of Kant's or Hegel's theory of
retribution. These concepts and practices are not a matter of Kantian or Hegelian philosophies of punishment.
The word retribution in its best dictionary meaning is defined
as "the dispensing or receiving of reward or punishment according
to the deserts of the individual." 26 6 The key word-"deserts"-has a
Kantian or Hegelian meaning on a philosophical level. In the world
of action, however, the meaning of the word "deserts" is defined
not by Kant or Hegel, but by context. "Deserts" arises from violating specific penal norms in a concrete historical and political context. "Deserts" is defined in diverse sentencing statutes, in prison
codes, and in day-to-day practice. The concept is not monolithic.
Nazis, Stalinists, militarists, religionists, democrats, republicans,
and others define "deserts" and operationalize its meanings in
penal codes, courts, and prisons. Some of these definitions and practices are a horror, and some are probably justified. In all cases, however, the content for "deserts" comes from the underlying ideological and material context. To invoke the names of Kant and Hegel,
among others, in service of "deserts" is in some cases to cloak the
indefensible with philosophical authority; in other cases, it at least
obscures the true ground of "deserts" in the dominant ideological
and material contexts. Popular retributive concepts and practices
are artifacts of such ideologies and interests. The philosophical
theories are invoked not as a priori justifications, but as post hoe
rationalizations.
266.

VEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1940 (unabr.

ed.

1971).
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PART V

HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
A human rights theory of criminal law begins with a specific
view of the person, of society, and of the relationship between the
two. 2 67 The initial premise is that humans are social animals of
great worth who realize their inherent potentialities in social life in
the context of community. Stated differently, we become human
through shared interactions with others, not alone. Becoming
human in accordance with a humanistic model requires forms of
social interaction which foster, rather than impede, the realization
of human potentialities (i.e., physical, emotional, aesthetic, intellectual, ethical, and fraternal). Becoming human in accordance with
this model is not only an individual odyssey: We journey together,
and one of the fundamental needs is to actualize our potential for
human solidarity. Becoming human, then, is a continuing process
of human liberation; of realizing our potentialities so that we can
evolve towards what we could be, individually and communally.
This process has cultural and institutional dimensions governed by
a common theme: Structures exist to serve humans.
We actualize our potentialities through the realization of our
human rights. The human rights formulation translates the process
of becoming human from an abstract, philosophical level to a more
concrete level.
In addition to domestic articulation of human rights, an array
of human rights has been articulated in a variety of international
declarations, treaties, and proposals. 2 68 These include the United
2 70
Nations Charter;2 69 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its
Optional Protocol;2 71 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 7 2 the International
TOWARDS A

267. The purpose of this section is to postulate a human rights theory of criminal law. Necessarily, the theory is not fully developed here. The segment on individual punishment is especially embryonic.
268. For a collection of documents relating to human rights, see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
269. See U.N. CHARTER ch. 1, art. 1, para. 3.
270. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
271. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
272. G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc A/6014
(1965).
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 2 73 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 274 The human rights articulated in these international
declarations and treaties provide a concrete humanistic basis for
guiding, measuring, and judging progress towards the ideal of
2 75
human liberation.
The contemporary articulation of human rights, whether at the
domestic or international level, provides a framework for constructing a human rights theory and practice of criminal law. In this
endeavor, the first question is what is to be justified, i.e., the nature and scope of a theory of criminal law, including a justification
of punishment. As previously argued, this includes:
276
Justifying punishment as a moral claim.
Justifying the substantive content of a penal code (i.e.,
the specific principles, doctrines, and prohibitions set
forth in the general and special parts), and justifying
277
the content of a code of criminal procedure.
C. Justifying "law-in-action" and the actual imposition of
2 78
punishment against particular individuals.
D. Justifying punishment as an integral part of a theory
of criminal law rooted in political-legal theories which
justify other institutions in the matrix of which
2 79
punishment finds its meaning and expression.
E. Justifying the quantitative role of the criminal law in a
2 0
society-the "how much" question.

A.
B.

A.
Utilizing internationally-prescribed legal rights in constructing
a human rights approach meets H.L.A. Hart's initial requirement
that a theory of punishment be a moral claim. A human rights
273.

G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316

(1966).
274. G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948). This treaty came into force
and was registered ex officio Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

275. For a discussion of international protection of human rights, see Lane,
Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOFsTRA L. REV.
269 (1978).

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See
See
See
See
See

text accompanying note 139 supra.
text accompanying notes 139 & 140 supra.
id.
id.
id.
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theory of punishment is not an empirical claim. It is a moral claim
"'as to what justifies the practice of punishment-claims as
to why,
morally, it should or may be used." 28 1 The distinctive nature of
this moral claim is revealed by contrasting it with the theories of
general deterrence and retribution. They are moral claims too.
General deterrence, even within a utilitarian framework, is a veritable "engine of justification." Given the malleable concept of utillity and the deterrent emphasis on enforcement, a great variety
of criminal law systems have been justified. Certainly there is no
inherent human rights focus in the deterrent theory of punishment. 282 The moral claims in the Kantian and Hegelian theories of
retribution seem to be predominately related to punishment as an
ideology and apparatus of status quo domination. A human rights
approach, however, is a different moral claim, a marked contrast to
deterrent and retributive theories.
B.
A criminal law is justified if it fosters the realization of the
internationally-specified human rights in its principles, doctrines,
and prohibitions. The justification of a penal law is part of the justification of all law: to foster human liberation by embodying
human rights in political, economic, legal, and other institutions.
This justification of law is an imperative derived from a humanistic
view of the raison d'6tre of all institutions. As a central institution
in society, the criminal law system must contribute to the realization of the humanistic master beliefs in everyday life, and to the
creation of that form of social intercourse which fosters the fulfillment of human potentialities. A fortiori, the principles, doctrines,
and prohibitions in a penal law must do so.
The internationally-prescribed human rights provide a concrete basis for translating this abstract justification into specific
criteria for evaluating and reconstructing a criminal law code.2 8 3 In
illustrating this process, it is useful to distinguish those rights
which, at a minimum, should be protected in all criminal codes from
those rights which arguably warrant protection by embodiment into
penal norms depending on varying cultural and social traditions. It
281. H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 72 (emphasis deleted).
282. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 42.

283. These rights delineate specific conceptions of justice and freedom, The
explication of these conceptions-politically, economically, and culturally-is beyond the scope of this article.
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is important to note, also, that a penal prohibition is the embodiment of a duty that is an expression of a particular right (e.g., the
right to bodily integrity leads to a penal prohibition of assault and
rape). Finally, the new theory and specification of internationallyprescribed rights leads to a focus on the violation of rights by state
officials as well as to a focus on the violation of rights by "subjects."
There is a new focus on crimes characteristic of such officials (e.g.,
aggressive war, genocide, and apartheid). The criminal law becomes not only an instrument through which state officials
vindicate state interests as they determine them; it is designed also
to protect against depredations by state officials. The idea of penal
harm therefore is broadened by a human rights perspective.
Examples of the translation of internationally-prescribed rights into
penal prohibitions are the following:
Penal Prohibitions

InternationallyBased Rights
Civil and PoliticalRights
being has the inherent
"Every human
284
right to life."

Aggressive war; genocide; homicide.

"The right to security of person and
protection by the State against violence
or bodily harm, whether inflicted by
Government officials or by any indi285
...
vidual, group or institution.

Assault; rape; robbery;
compulsory sterilization;
resocialization.

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence

Illegal wiretapping; "bugging"; burglary; interference with mail and with
fourth and fifth amendment rights.

"No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
287
...
treatment or punishment.

Torture; "third degree"; extreme forms
of harrassment.

"[T]he right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion ...."288

Serious, willful violations
criminalized.

kidnapping;
compulsory

"286

could be

284. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III art. 6 § 1, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
285. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, pt. I art. 5 § (b), G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
286. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III art. 17 § 1,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
287. Id. pt. III art. 7.
288. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
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"[T]he right to own property alone
as well as in association with others
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Penal Prohibitions (continued)
Larceny.

"289

Social, Economic and Cultural Rights
"[T]he right to work, . . . [including]
[f]air wages . . . equal pay for equal
work... [and] [s]afe and healthy working conditions .... "290

Serious, willful violations should be
criminalized.

"[T]he . . right of everyone to be free
from hunger ...."291

Serious, willful
criminalized.

violation could

"[T]he right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing ...."292

Serious, willful
criminalized.

violation

could

"[T]he right of everyone to education Serious, willful
... . Higher education shall be made criminalized.
equally accessible to all on the basis of
2..."293
capacity .

violation

could

be

A criminal law, in addition to affirmatively embodying human
rights norms, also acts as a barrier to the introduction of antihuman
rights norms, for example, apartheid restrictions. In this preventive function, a penal law preserves freedom by prohibiting arrest,
charge, conviction, and punishment on substantive grounds which
violate human rights. A penal law, then, preserves our right to be
free from state intrusion on our freedom except on the grounds of
our violation of the specified human rights of others.
A code of criminal procedure is justified if it fosters human
rights in its specification of procedural rights. These rights are
specified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights2 9 4 and include the guarantees which have evolved in the
crimination, pt. I art. 5 § (d)(vii), G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47,
U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965).
289. Id. pt. I art. 5 § (d)(v).
290. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. III
arts. 6 § 1, 7 § a (i), G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doe.
A/6316 (1966).
291. Id. art. 11 § 2.
292. Id. art. 11 § 1.
293. Id. art. 13 §§ 1, 2(c).
294. G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966).
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Western tradition through centuries of struggle. Among these
rights are: "the right to liberty and security of person"; 295 the prohibition of "arbitrary arrest or detention"; 29 6 the right to be promptly informed of charges after an arrest;2 97 the right to prompt arraignment and trial; 2 98 the right to challenge the legality of an arrest or
detention; 299 the right to a fair trial by a "competent, independent
and impartial tribunal";3 00 and the right to appeal. 30 1 In its preventive function, a procedural code preserves our right to be let alone
by restricting arrest, charge, conviction, and punishment except in
accordance with procedural rights. In addition to the manifest function of protecting the rights of those who are accused, a procedural
code prohibits arbitrary arrest and conviction and thereby protects
the liberty of all.
Both a penal law and a procedural code foster and preserve
freedom for those who are arrested, for those who will be arrested,
and for those who will never be arrested. Indeed, those who assume freedom from state intrusion in their lives, and who assume
their rights to life, to their thoughts, to their religion, and to their
communal life, are important beneficiaries of a penal law and procedural code which reflect substantive and procedural human
rights. A human rights theory of criminal law explicitly justifies preserving and strengthening freedom as a primary purpose of the
criminal law process. Within this theory, the rule of law has a
specific substantive and procedural content: It is a human rights
rule of law. The principle of legality (no crime, no punishment,
without law) is modified: no crime, no punishment, without human
rights law.
C.
Shared responsibility includes individual responsibility. The
premises of individual responsibility and choice are a sine qua
non in a humanistic framework as they are in much of traditional Western thought. The humanistic emphasis on realizing human rights and freedom requires these postulates. The humanistic approach, however, is to make these postulates empirically real.
295. Id. pt. III art. 9 § 1.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 2.

298.

Id. § 3.

299.
300.

Id. § 4.
Id. art. 14 § 1.

301.

Id. § 5.
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As the institutions evolve and actualize human rights norms, and as
individuals personify these norms in their lives, a momentum towards the fulfillment of human rights principles is fostered. Both
consciousness and practice evolve concurrently. In this evolution,
all should participate and be responsible for their acts. Violation of
humanistic norms impedes the evolutionary process and justifies
punishment. This punishment, however, is not the deterrent use of
the person as an example/scapegoat; nor is it the retributive use of
the person for retaliation, restoration of the disturbed "equilibrium," or even satisfaction of a notion of just desert.
Punishment, then, is one way for the community to say that it
intends to make these norms real so that the evolution towards a
human rights society will continue effectively. Punishment is one
communal method for affirming and actualizing the humanistic consciousness. The community's action in punishing a violator should
be conceived as a powerful symbolic act to affirm and validate its
core values. The community's action in punishing also affirms and
validates these values by compelling an awareness of their importance upon the individual violator himself. This awareness is essential for both personal and communal evolution.
Individual responsibility for observance of prescribed human
rights is an imperative of humanistic interaction. It highlights the
obligations we owe to each other to respect human worth and dignity. Without mutual observance of human rights, our opportunities for freedom through realization of rights is diminished. It is
precisely the importance of the rights at stake that justifies punishment against those who impair human rights by violation.
To make these rights real in everyday life requires a recognition that rights impose duties. The enjoyment of one's rights requires that others in the social matrix of one's life recognize these
rights. Others recognize our rights by fulfilling duties which are
correlative to such rights. These duties are of two types: first, a
duty not to violate our rights by positive action (e.g., aggressive
war and homicide which violate our "inherent right to life"); and
second, a duty not to violate our rights by negative action (e.g.,
failure to assure "the right to work" or to assure "safe and healthy
working conditions"). Since we become human in a communal
process, the mutual observance of rights and correlative duties is
essential. We affirm the rights of others by fulfilling our duties to
them; others affirm our rights by fulfilling their duties to us.
In the struggle to evolve in accordance with human rights
principles, all are obligated to fulfill these duties, including those
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who are most victimized. Victimization creates no right to victimize
others. Even if a penal code is not presently justified from a human
rights perspective, the duty to observe the human rights of others
does not end. These rights are preexisting moral-legal claims. A
penal law codifies these claims, but it does not create them. Their
ground is not in the penal law which affirms them, but in the dignity and worth of each person. Victimizing others (usually other
victims) aggravates victimization. In degrading others, we degrade
ourselves, deepen our own victimization, and impede both a communal and personal evolution towards fulfllment of human rights
principles. In respecting the human rights of others, we need not,
therefore, approve a penal code-or a political-legal order-which
presently fails to meet human rights requirements.
In punishing, any scapegoating of the offender is specifically
prohibited; it is antithetical to the idea of punishment as a communal method for affirming and attaining human rights. The commission of the offense is not an occasion for sacrificing the offender. The realization of human rights has basic institutional and
cultural realms. To place a disproportionate burden for this realization on the offender is to slight the role that should be played by
institutional and cultural structures, and by all of us. The burden
that is attributable to the offender arises from the type of harm
inflicted-the act, its consequences, and the significance accorded
to both. The harm inflicted determines the permissible extent of
the punishment. There is a fundamental communal interest in
maximizing freedom and, therefore, in limiting the right to punish.
Punishment includes condemnation. Henry M. Hart has
suggested that the "judgment of community condemnation" is what
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction. 30 2 This condemnation
expresses, in Joel Feinberg's words, a communal "judgment" of
"disapproval" of the behavior.3 0 3 Inherent in the condemnation is
an authoritative disavowal of the wrong; a symbolic nonacquiescence, rejecting any responsibility that may be implied by silence
in the face of wrong doing; and a vindication of the law.
The condemnation manifesting a human rights approach, however, is quite different from traditional forms of condemnation. The
human rights condemnation is an affirmation and actualization of
the humanistic consciousness for the community, the violator, and
302.
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the victim. This condemnation is not the expression of the community's hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict. It is not an expression of vengeance or retaliation. Nor is it a use of the violator as an
"example." These are words and images of scapegoatism-of
pariah-creation, of evading our complicity in much wrongdoing. It
is possible, in contrast, to condemn a violation of right with the
implied disavowal, nonacquiescence, and affirmation of the right,
without scapegoatism, vengeance, hatred, or contempt. The condemnation is primarily of the act, not the violator.
This may seem an artificial distinction; after all, the act is personal, not abstract, and we punish the person who commits it.
Nevertheless, the difference is real: witness the theological idea of
hating the sin, not the sinner. The sinner, though responsible for
the wrong, remains a valued member of the religious community.
The violator, though responsible for the act, remains a valued
member of the humanistic community. This image of the violator
is the antithesis of the traditional image of him as an object of
scapegoatism, vengeance, hatred, or contempt. The distinction
seems well-grounded, too, in our ability to judge morally many acts
as violations of rights and as producing rippling forms of harm
against others in the community. This harm is usually manifest, or
at least discernible. But how do we morally judge an individual? To
do so validly would require knowledge of all the past and present
social, psychological, and biological variables, the ability to assign
weight to each, insight into the violator's decisionmaking process,
and the wisdom to judge all these factors. That judgment is a task
for gods, not human beings.
The incorporation of the distinction between condemning an
act and condemning the actor into our consciousness and our
practice of punishment requires a fundamental shift in the way we
think and act. This shift will not be easy, but it is not impossible.
Berman expresses an example of condemnation of the act in the
Russian peasant's conception of the corporate character of sin.
While criminal punishment is valid for the prohibited act, the offender is regarded as an " 'unfortunate one'-a victim of society or
of his own human temptations or perhaps of both. . . . [T]he com4
munity shares in his guilt." 30
In the human rights form of punishment, we punish a member
of the community, not an outsider, not a "criminal." We punish
someone whose guilt we share to some degree. We punish with
304.
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respect and humility, not contempt and self-righteousness. Life is a
web whose strands tie us all together.
In addition to condemnation, a human rights punishment
could utilize other methods for affirming and actualizing the
humanistic consciousness for the community, the violator, and the
victim. Reparation should be a central theme and practice. Reparation focuses on concrete material and symbolic measures to restore both the individual who has been harmed and the specific
communal interests which may have been harmed. In emphasizing
reparation, there is a recognition that the violation of the right can
never be undone. The reparation is not intended to do so. Where
material measures are impractical or insufficient, symbolic measures are still emphasized. It is illusory, however, to believe that
such techniques will be useful unless they are part of a broad effort
to realize human rights. Indeed, without an evolving consciousness
and practice, the techniques are a charade. The punishment process will not have a different meaning.
D. and E.
Justifying the extent of the role of the criminal law in a society
evolving in accordance with humanistic principles-the how much
question-requires a context for analysis. The how much question
needs to be raised in the context of a how much question for other
institutions. Thus, the reformulated question is: how much do we
expect to achieve from the criminal law institution relative to what
we expect to achieve from other institutions? To begin to think
about this question requires consideration of the rationale underlying the criminal law institution and the rationale of other institutions. The human rights rationale of the criminal law is a reflection
of a general rationale of all institutions: All institutions should foster human liberation by enabling individuals to fulfill their potentialities in diverse realms through the realization of their human
rights. For example, the economic institution enables individuals to
realize their economic rights (e.g., the right to work or the right to
an adequate standard of living). The educational institution fosters
the realization of educational rights. Theoreticians, including
theologians, philosophers, and social theorists, critique dominant
theory, structures, and operations, including the human rights approach. Political and legal institutions translate human rights into
specific, enforceable legal rights (civil, political, social, economic,
and cultural rights). These legal rights are law-in-the-books in the
process of becoming law-in-action.
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All of these institutions have an important responsibility for
realizing human rights. As this process is being realized, the role
of the criminal law institution is important but not primary. The
humanistic premise is that a severely coercive instituion-punishment-should be used as sparingly as possible, and that this normative postulate can be realized in everyday life. If human rights are
being increasingly realized, the role of the criminal law institution
will be secondary. If they are not being increasingly realized, the
remedy is primarily within other institutions, or in alternatives to
them, not in an expanded role for criminal law. Extreme coercibn
cannot be the means to realize human rights.
The problems of crime control, social control, and law and
order are viewed as a consequence of success or failure in attaining
human rights. Such problems are conceptualized and formulated as
a consequence of political, economic, educational, and cultural deficiencies, perhaps at fundamental levels, and not simply as individual problems which are the responsibility of the criminal law.
The response to crime should be primarily the reign of justice. The
punishment of individual offenders through the criminal law process is rejected as the remedy to systemic violations, including: (1)
aggressive war, genocide, apartheid, victimization of consumers
and workers, and the poisoning of our air, food, and water; (2)
offenses disproportionally centered in victimized social groups (e.g.,
traditional homicides, assault, robbery, and burglary); and (3) offenses related to culturally glorified values such as greed and violence (e.g., larceny by the poor and rich and the violent crimes
specified above).
The answer to the "how much" question depends on the evolutionary stage of the society. If systemic problems are endemic, it
is vital that the role of the criminal law be limited to avoid obfuscating and mystifying the problem (e.g., blaming the victim). If
such problems are substantially overcome, this risk is less, and the
role could be enlarged. There is no definitive answer, for it depends on the stage of evolution.
Nevertheless, a range of contemporary debate and action
about criminal law responses to crime would fade. Draconian sentencing schemes, capital punishment, expansion of public and private policing, the symbolic dramatization through the crimedominated TV screen-all of this would fade as a masking and
obfuscating charade. With few exceptions, maximum sentences
would be radically reduced. Alternatives to the criminal law process-and alternatives to imprisonment-would be emphasized.
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The rejection of punishment as the remedy to systemic problems does not require rejection of punishment of individuals. Institutions act through individuals who fill institutional roles. The
state, for example, acts not abstractly but through officials who are
responsible for their acts. Corporations act through corporate officials. Moreover, violations of human rights by crime is not reducible to a systemic dimension. Violations spring from individuals acting in institutional and private roles. Individual responsibility for
one's acts is a cardinal humanistic principle and also a premise in
the post-World War II treaties, declarations, and proposals. It is an
ethical and legal sine qua non.

CONCLUSION

The traditional emphasis upon punishment reflects narrow
conceptions of human existence. We need not elevate into fixed
principles the notions of general prevention, vengeance, retaliation,
or even the quid pro quo principle of desert. At worst, these notions reflect some of the lowest levels in human consciousness.
Many people struggle to transcend these levels of existence, knowing from experience, as well as from literature and philosophy, that
hatred begets hatred, contempt begets contempt, and violence
begets violence. At best, these notions reflect a ledger-sheet approach to life. Many people struggle to transcend this level of existence, too, because it is inconsistent with the complexity and
mystery of human behavior and emerges from a low level of consciousness. To be sure, a substantial segment of crime victims (as
well as many others) want punishment in the form of vengeance, an
example, or variations thereof. But others are ready to forgive, and
still others to transcend such responses and proceed with life's
business. Some of these people are fatalistic, either on religious or
secular grounds ("It is God's Will" or que serd serd"). Some may
simply be oriented towards the present and future, not the past.
Some may doubt the wisdom of punishment on philosophical or
other grounds or may feel a moral complicity. This variety of responses is illustrative, not exhaustive, and is rooted in a diversity of
life experiences and orientations. These responses illustrate, also,
that the emphasis upon punishment is itself a human product
which rests not in human nature but in particular conceptions of
life within a far larger universe of possibilities. In punishment, as
in other realms of life, we can actualize higher or lower levels of
consciousness. Either choice starts rippling waves whose end we
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cannot see. As human consciousness evolves, as a community embodies human rights, we should have less need and inclination to
punish individuals with a traditional consciousness and practice.
The emphasis upon these forms of punishment could fade and be
recalled eventually as an artifact of epochs in the evolution of
humankind.
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